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THE HUMAN APPROACH TO WORLD PEACE
His Holiness the Dalai Lama
When we rise in the morning and listen to the radio or read the newspaper, we
are confronted with the same sad news: violence, crime, wars and disasters. I cannot
recall a single day without a report of something terrible happening somewhere.
Even in these modern times it is clear that one’s precious life is not safe. No former
generation has had to experience so much bad news as we face today; this constant
awareness of fear and tension should make any sensitive and compassionate person
question seriously the progress of our modern world.
It is ironic that the more serious problems emanate from the more industrially
advanced societies. Science and technology have worked wonders in many fields,
but the basic human problems remain. There is unprecedented literacy, yet this
universal education does not seem to have fostered goodness, but only mental
restlessness and discontent instead. There is no doubt about the increase in our
material progress and technology, but somehow this is not sufficient, as we have not
yet succeeded in bringing about peace and happiness or in overcoming suffering.
We can only conclude that there must be something seriously wrong with our
progress and development, and if we do not check it in time, there could be
disastrous consequences for the future of humanity. I am not at all against science
and technology—they have contributed immensely to the overall experience of
humankind; to our material comfort and well-being and to our greater understanding
of the world we live in. But if we give too much emphasis to science and
technology, we are in danger of losing touch with those aspects of human
knowledge and understanding that aspire towards honesty and altruism.
Science and technology, though capable of creating immeasurable material
comfort, cannot replace the age-old spiritual and humanitarian values that have
largely shaped world civilization, in all its national forms, as we know it today. No
one can deny the unprecedented material benefit of science and technology, but our
basic human problems remain; we are still faced with the same, if not more,
suffering, fear and tension. Thus it is only logical to try to strike a balance between
material development on the one hand and the development of spiritual, human
values on the other. In order to bring about this great adjustment, we need to revive
our humanitarian values.
I am sure that many people share my concern about the present worldwide moral
crisis and will join in my appeal to all humanitarians and religious practitioners who
also share this concern to help make our societies more compassionate, just and
equitable. I do not speak as a Buddhist or even as a Tibetan. Nor do I speak as an
expert on international politics (though I unavoidably comment on these matters).
Rather, I speak simply as a human being, as an upholder of the humanitarian values
that are the bedrock not only of Mahayana Buddhism but of all the great world
religions. From this perspective I share with you my personal outlook:
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1. Universal humanitarianism is essential to solve global problems;
2. Compassion is the pillar of world peace;
3. All world religions support world peace in this way, as are all
humanitarians of whatever ideology;
4. Each individual has a universal responsibility to shape institutions to serve
human needs.

Of the many problems we face today, some are natural calamities and must be
accepted and faced with equanimity. Others, however, are of our own making,
created by misunderstanding, and can be corrected. One such type arises from the
conflict of ideologies, political or religious, when people fight each other for petty
ends, losing sight of the basic humanity that binds us all together as a single human
family. We must remember that the different religions, ideologies and political
systems of the world are meant for human beings to achieve happiness. We must
not lose sight of this fundamental goal and at no time should we place means above
ends; the supremacy of humanity over matter and ideology must always be
maintained.
Despite the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear destruction continues to be
a great danger facing humankind—in fact, to all living beings on our planet. I need
not elaborate on this danger, but I would like to appeal to all the leaders of the
nuclear powers who literally hold the future of the world in their hands, to the
scientists and technicians who continue to create these awesome weapons of
destruction, and to all the people at large who are in a position to influence their
leaders. I appeal to them to exercise their sanity and begin to work at dismantling
and destroying all nuclear weapons. We know that in the event of a nuclear war
there will be no victors because there will be no survivors! Is it not frightening even
to contemplate such inhuman and heartless destruction? And, is it not logical that
we should remove the cause for our own destruction when we know the cause and
have both time and means to do so? Often we cannot overcome our problems
because we either do not know the cause or, if we understand it, do not have the
means to remove it. This is not the case with the nuclear threat.
Whether they belong to more evolved species like humans or to simpler ones
such as animals, all beings primarily seek peace, comfort and security. Life is as
dear to the mute animal as it is to any human being; even the insect strives for
protection from dangers that threaten its life. Just as each one of us wants to live and
does not wish to die, so it is with all other creatures in the universe, though their
power to affect this is a different matter.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of happiness and suffering—mental and
physical—and of the two I believe that mental suffering and happiness are the more
acute. Hence, I stress the training of the mind to endure suffering and attain a more
lasting state of happiness. However, I also have a more general and concrete idea of
happiness: a combination of inner peace, economic development and, above all,
world peace. To achieve such goals, I feel it is necessary to develop a sense of
universal responsibility, a deep concern for all irrespective of creed, colour, sex or
nationality.
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The premise behind this idea of universal responsibility is the simple fact that, in
general terms, all others’ desires are the same as mine. Every being wants happiness
and does not want suffering. If we, as intelligent human beings, do not accept this
fact, there will be more and more suffering on this planet. If we adopt a self-centred
approach to life and constantly try to use others for our own self-interest, we may
gain temporary benefits, but in the long run we will not succeed in achieving even
personal happiness, and world peace will be completely out of the question.
In their quest of happiness, humans have used different methods, which all too
often have been cruel and repellent. Behaving in ways utterly unbecoming to their
status as humans, they inflict suffering upon fellow humans and other living beings
for their own selfish gains. In the end, such short-sighted actions bring suffering to
oneself as well as to others. To be born a human being is a rare event in itself, and it
is wise to use this opportunity as effectively and skillfully as possible. We must
have the proper perspective of that universal life process, so the happiness or glory
of one person or group is not sought at the expense of others.
All this calls for a new approach to global problems. The world is becoming
smaller and smaller—and more and more interdependent—as a result of rapid
technological advances and international trade as well as increasing trans-national
relations. We now depend very much on each other. In ancient times problems were
mostly family-size, and they were naturally tackled at the family level, but the
situation has changed. Today we are so interdependent, so closely interconnected
with each other, that without a sense of universal responsibility, a feeling of
universal brotherhood and sisterhood, and an understanding and belief that we really
are a part of one big human family, we cannot hope to overcome the dangers to our
very existence—let along bring about peace and happiness.
One nation’s problems can no longer be satisfactorily solved by itself alone; too
much depends on the interest, attitude and cooperation of other nations. A universal
humanitarian approach to world problems seems the only sound basis for world
peace. What does this mean? We begin from the recognition mentioned previously
that all beings cherish happiness and do not want suffering. It then becomes both
morally wrong and pragmatically unwise to pursue only one’s own happiness
oblivious to the feelings and aspirations of all others who surround us as members
of the same human family. The wiser course is to think of others also when pursuing
our own happiness. This will lead to what I call “wise self-interest”, which
hopefully will transform itself into “compromised self-interest”, or better still,
“mutual interest”.
Although the increasing interdependence among nations might be expected to
generate more sympathetic cooperation, it is difficult to achieve a spirit of genuine
cooperation, as long as people remain indifferent to the feelings and happiness of
others. When people are motivated mostly by greed and jealousy, it is not possible
for them to live in harmony. A spiritual approach may not solve all the political
problems that have been caused by the existing self-centred approach, but in the
long run it will overcome the very basis of the problems that we face today.
On the other hand, if humankind continues to approach its problems considering
only temporary expediency, future generations will have to face tremendous
difficulties. The global population is increasing, and our resources are being rapidly
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depleted. Look at the trees, for example. No one knows exactly what adverse effects
massive deforestation will have on the climate, the soil and global ecology as a
whole. We are facing problems because people are concentrating only on their
short-term, selfish interests, not thinking of the entire human family. They are not
thinking of the earth and the long-term effects on the universal life as a whole. If we
of the present generation do not think about these now, future generations may not
be able to cope with them.

KILLING, LETTING DIE, AND THE ALLEGED NECESSITY
OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
Laurie Calhoun
Abstract
Recent international developments have introduced the possibility of war waged
on behalf of people unable to defend themselves, and when the attacking parties’
interests appear not to be at stake. Are purely military forms of “humanitarian
intervention” sometimes morally required? Can such military missions be
reconciled with the widely held belief in the moral distinction between killing and
letting die? In exploring these questions, the two dominant paradigms in writing
about war are considered: just war theory and utilitarianism. The moral centrality of
intentions emerges through an explanation of the distinction often made between
natural and man-made catastrophe. Ultimately, the alleged permissibility of the
“collateral damage” to which military intervention gives rise implies the
permissibility of pacifism, thus invalidating the claim that the resort to deadly force
is sometimes morally obligatory.
Introduction
In civil society, to terminate another person’s life is usually considered a crime.
Exceptions to the prohibition against killing must be justified. Most people regard
self-defense as permissible, but other forms of killing are far more controversial.
Abortion and euthanasia are fiercely debated moral issues because it is unclear
whether fetuses are persons and whether human beings have the right to terminate
their own lives. Capital punishment is opposed by many on the grounds that the
“self-defense” rationale fails, for a convict has already been incapacitated in the
relevant way. Nor does there appear to be empirical evidence for any deterrent
effect, which some maintain would permit an interpretation of the practice as a form
of community “self-defense”.
War, the socially coordinated use of deadly force by groups against other groups,
prematurely terminates human lives. Because wars involve many different people,
moral judgments regarding war and the various actions carried out by military
personnel during wartime are highly complex. The diffusion of moral responsibility,
characteristic of wartime activity, arises because a variety of agents are contributing
in one way or another to what amounts, taken as a whole, to a war. Although leaders
wage wars, rarely do modern leaders themselves wield deadly weapons. Rather,
leaders order their troops to kill, and, far more often than not, the troops obey
(Calhoun, 2002c).
In the standard public justification of war, an enemy nation has acted so as to
mandate military retaliation by the victimized nation. The rhetoric of “just
retribution” continues to be wielded by leaders, but the United Nations now
officially condones the use of deadly force only in the name of defense. Allegedly
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“just retribution” metamorphoses all too quickly to vindictive revenge. In the case
of individual self-defense, only a threat to one’s very existence could justify the
death of one’s aggressor, but less destructive forms of debilitation should be
attempted, when feasible.
While the analogy to personal self-defense is frequently invoked and persuasive
to many, the notion of “national self-defense” is fraught with difficulties. Because a
nation is not a biological organism, the idea that a nation ought to protect its “life”
does not apply. Furthermore, while persons are sentient, rational, conscious beings
who were born innocent, no nation shares the first three of these properties, and
some would insist that the establishment of most nations in existence has involved
the victimization of indigenous peoples. In addition, analogies of nations to persons
commit the fallacy of composition (Calhoun, 2000). Nonetheless, in spite of what
appear to be intractable conceptual difficulties with “national self-defense”,
rhetorically persuasive leaders nearly always garner support for their wars through
appeal to precisely this notion.
Not all theorists regard war and the military activities within the context of war
as susceptible of moral judgment. Two distinct forms of realism about war are
sometimes conflated. One version of “realism” is simply moral relativism applied to
the case of war. According to moral relativists, “Everything is permitted”, so “All’s
fair…in war” as in everything else. However, some soi-disant “realists” about war
uphold the absolutism of morality when it comes to the conduct of individual
agents, (whether such a stance is consistent is unclear, given that wars are waged
and executed by individual agents). Realist paradigms are frequently invoked in
retrospective historical analyses of wars, while philosophers often attempt to reach
normative conclusions, invoking one or another well-established idealist paradigm
and assessing whether a given conflict passes that paradigm’s test. Leaders
themselves invariably justify wars to their populace by appeal to moral frameworks.
In public discourse regarding war, the dominant frameworks have been the idealist
perspectives of just war theory and utilitarianism.
Standard Normative Approaches to War: Just War Theory and Utilitarianism
Writers in the just war tradition have always insisted that a set of conditions
must be met in order for a military campaign to be morally permitted. The just war
tradition presumes what is widely accepted in modern societies, that civilians may
never kill other civilians, except in self-defense, and even then only as a last resort.
By articulating requirements upon a just war, ancient and medieval thinkers
affirmed as the default position that it is wrong to kill, and that exceptions to this
rule must be justified. Specifically, the jus ad bellum conditions require that war be
publicly declared by a legitimate authority with right intention as a last resort with a
reasonable chance for success and for a just cause sufficiently grave to warrant
recourse to deadly force. Once justly waged, a war remains just (jus in bello) only
so long as non-combatants (including prisoners of war and soldiers who surrender)
are treated as immune from attack, and the means deployed are not disproportionate
to the moral end to be achieved.
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Self-defense is often regarded as a cause weighty enough to bear within it the
other requirements of just war theory, and literal self-defense may be the only cause
sufficiently weighty to justify killing, since any lesser cause would seem to violate
the rational constraint of proportionality. Douglas Lackey applies the
proportionality constraint in his analysis of the 1991 Gulf War as follows:
Since the damage to Iraq was nearly total, and Iraq is considerably
larger than Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait cannot counterbalance
the destruction of Iraq. If Saddam is evil because he has brought so
much death and destruction into the world, the moral remedy can
hardly be to cause even more destruction and death (1991, p. 278).
Comparing the action provoking retaliation and the retaliation itself in terms of
sheer numbers of deaths (several hundred versus several hundred thousand),
Lackey’s early assessment has become a fortiori persuasive more than ten years
after the Gulf War. In any case, whether or not just war theorists agree with
Lackey’s assessment, they do share a commitment to the basic principle of
proportionality.
Non-threatening civilians, including children, die in every modern war.
According to some thinkers, the requirements of classical just war theory can no
longer be met. But self-proclaimed “just war theorists” hold open the possibility of a
just war, for they do not typically think that the requirement of non-combatant
immunity implies the impossibility of a just war. In their view, so long as noncombatants were not targeted, they have not been wronged when killed collaterally
by soldiers fighting in a just war, even if the deaths were foreseen.
The most important (idealist) rival to the just war tradition is utilitarianism.
“Utilitarianism” is the ethical theory according to which one ought to act so as to
maximize the utility (usually construed as happiness) of the greatest number. If
through killing some people in war, one will thereby secure the well-being and/or
happiness of the whole group, then utilitarianism deems killing not merely
permissible but, further, obligatory. There is a sense in which a utilitarian constraint
is built into just war theory, given its proportionality requirement. Although just war
theorists insist that there are important distinctions between the two approaches,
when leaders explicate their reasons for advocating war, they nearly always appeal
to some variant of utilitarian reasoning. Regarding the need to consider
consequences, Michael Walzer writes:
…the case for breaking the rules and violating those rights [to life
of innocents] is made sufficiently often, and by soldiers and
statesmen who cannot always be called wicked, so that we have to
assume that it isn't pointless…the very existence of a community
may be at stake, and then how can we fail to consider possible
outcomes in judging the course of the fighting? At this point, if at
no other, the restraint on utilitarian calculation must be lifted (1977,
p. 228).

8

Killing, Letting Die

Note that Walzer overlooks a plausible alternative to calling soldiers and statesmen
“wicked”. They may simply be ignorant. Walzer also fails to recognize that to
accept utilitarian reasoning in war is to accept utilitarianism, tout court. To say that
“rights always trump”, except when it comes to war, is simply to deny that “rights
always trump”. (The expression “rights trump” is derived from Dworkin, 1978.)
Consistent utilitarians are ready and willing even to kill innocent people, if
necessary. The alleged permissibility of “collateral damage”, and the euphemistic
manner in which it is described by the military and the media alike, is perfectly in
keeping with the utilitarian outlook. In view of the virtual inevitability of noncombatant civilian deaths attending any decision to resort to military intervention in
the modern world, some contemporary scholars maintain that only utilitarian
reasoning could justify war. Furthermore, international law now prohibits the
waging of war for purely punitive or retributive causes (Richard Regan, 1996,
chapter 3). Wars may be waged only when they will lead to an overall improvement
in the current state of affairs. The “self-defense” rationale for war seems to many to
be fairly straightforward in the utilitarian framework. If more people will die if one
does nothing than if one goes to war, then, in this view, one is morally obliged to go
to war.
The major distinction between the “just war” and the classical utilitarian
approach is that the former insists upon the moral centrality of intention, while the
latter does not. Intentions are, strictly speaking, morally irrelevant in utilitarianism.
If a military campaign does not lead to an overall improvement in the state of affairs
for all members of the moral community, then, according to classical utilitarianism,
the executors of war have acted wrongly, even if they had the best of intentions. In
contrast, the just war tradition demands that the jus ad bellum requirements be
fulfilled, including right intention and just cause, in order for a war to be waged
justly. Only a war waged with moral intention could be conducted justly, but some
justly waged wars are conducted unjustly, viz., those in which the requirements of
jus in bello are violated.
In its insistence upon moral intention, just war theory may seem more complex
and demanding than utilitarianism. However, in another sense, just war theory is
less demanding, for it permits radically divergent interpretations of the same sets of
historical circumstances. Just war theory requires that there be a reasonable chance
for success, while utilitarianism requires success tout court, an objective
improvement in the state of affairs. So, for example, regarding the Gulf War, just
war theorists hold every conceivable position ranging along the entire spectrum of
possibilities. While some who apply just war theory conclude that the Gulf War was
an abomination, others are convinced that it was just. In view of the problem of
interpretation, some critics dismiss just war theory on the grounds that it is wielded
at least as often for evil as for good ends and is, in reality, the criminal leader’s most
deadly weapon. It seems fairly clear that every group that has committed mass
murder at the behest of its leader has been persuaded to do so by appeal to an
interpretation according to which those killings were “just” (Calhoun, 2002b).
But the problem of interpretation is pervasive and hardly unique to just war
theory. Although utilitarianism is an ostensibly simpler theory, an accurate
assessment of the morality of a war would require that one consider all

Laurie Calhoun

9

consequences of the resort to deadly force, a daunting task indeed. In reality, seldom
are more than the immediate consequences of prospective military action taken into
account. Ultimately, the conclusion one reaches through applying utilitarianism to a
particular instance of war will depend upon the length of time over which one
conducts one’s analysis. While military action may seem to be the optimum solution
in the short term, induction on the wars of the twentieth century might, in contrast,
lead one to conclude that recourse to war will never maximize utility (Calhoun,
2002a).
In the end, we will be plagued by the problem of interpretation whether we favor
just war theory or utilitarianism (or vacillate between the two). Still, from the
perspective of either the “just war” or the utilitarian approach, we can appreciate
Lackey’s concern with proportionality. Although he focuses upon “Bush’s Abuse of
Just War Theory”, Lackey’s criticism of the Gulf War can be read equally plausibly
as a utilitarian critique. The crucial point is that, in considering whether to resort to
the use of deadly force, a leader must, morally speaking, bear in mind the
consequences of his actions for his fellow human beings. According to
utilitarianism, the right action maximizes the happiness of the greatest number. If
waging war will result in a better net outcome, then war must be waged, and unless
war will result in a better net outcome, war may not be waged. But just war theory,
no less than utilitarianism, proscribes wars that culminate in pyrrhic victories.
Intervention, Sovereignty and Supererogation
In spite of our default presumption against killing, when a person succumbs to
disease or malnutrition, we do not hold morally culpable all those who might have
saved the victim. There are two notable exceptions: parents are held responsible for
their children’s death through neglect, and physicians for deaths caused through
their malpractice of medicine. Special responsibilities derive from the parents’ or
the physician’s special relation to the victim.
Military missions of “humanitarian intervention” pose new and unanswered
questions, for the attacking nations are not direct parties to the dispute allegedly
justifying recourse to war. The widespread belief in the necessity of a “self-defense”
rationale for killing explains why “humanitarian” military missions are often
regarded with suspicion by both the populace and military personnel. Since, by
definition, self-defense is self-referential, non-interventionists regard missions such
as NATO’s 1999 attack upon Kosovo as illegitimate, at best officious and at worst
immoral. Of course, cynics about particular conflicts often insist that, during
wartime, the self-interest of a nation masquerades as a moral cause weighty enough
to justify the annihilation of innocent people. For example, (then) President George
Bush justified the Gulf War sometimes as a reinstatement of justice and sometimes
as “self-defense”:
The state of Kuwait must be restored, or no nation will be safe, and
the promising future we anticipate will indeed be jeopardized (cited
in Sifray and Cerf, 1991, p. 229).
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Many people suspected that what really motivated Bush and other United States
strategists was concern over the control of oil in the region. This suspicion accrued
plausibility through a sober consideration of the many previous cases of “naked
aggression” committed throughout the world, and against which the United States
had taken no action whatsoever. “National prudence” or political realism and
morality are often conflated in public discourse about war.
According to some theorists, interventionism raises problems tangentially related
to the issue of “self-defense”. Michael Walzer (1977) argues for communities’
rights to self-determination and the state sovereignty, which this implies. In
Walzer’s view, only in extreme cases, what he terms “emergencies” of the
magnitude of genocide, can intervention in the affairs of another nation be justified.
According to advocates of state sovereignty, the right to self-defense on the part of a
nation is so weighty that most (if not all) intrusions by other nations constitute
veritable declarations of war against the people of the trespassed land. This idea,
that the people of a nation have the right to contend with their own problems, is not
simply a curiosity of political theory. Members of communities who regard
intervention as in some sense degrading hold precisely this view. As an illustration
of this perspective, in Randa Chahal Sabbag’s film Civilisées (2000), based on the
twenty year civil war in Lebanon, soldiers attack a representative of “Médecins sans
frontières” who insists that he has come to help them. Notably, even one of the
wounded soldiers, who presumably would benefit directly from medical assistance,
spurns the French doctor, telling him to mind his own business. The crux of this
controversy revolves around the level and quality of political content that may be
required in order for an established state to merit sovereignty. Some writers insist
that other peoples have the right to erect and maintain state structures that we may
view as unjust. Others would deny the status of “sovereign state” to incurably unjust
structures (Beitz, 1980).
Champions of sovereignty reject the validity of any military mission that does
not bear directly upon the attacking nation’s interests. But war advocates who
believe that leaders are not morally obliged to weigh the interests of all people
equally may insist (somewhat less emphatically) that no nation could be required to
help outsiders in need, though this may sometimes be permitted. “Humanitarian
interventions”, by definition, do not involve the “vital interests” of the intervening
nations. Accordingly, it is sometimes said that the military personnel in such cases
are acting supererogatorily, “above and beyond the call of duty”. In this view, the
beneficiaries of military intervention should simply be grateful that any form of
assistance whatsoever has been offered. The idea here is that, since the intervening
nations are doing the recipients of their action a favor, to which they are in no way
entitled, they have no grounds for complaint when the mission is not a resounding
success.
Wars of “supererogation” may not cohere well with the requirements of just war
theory, according to which just war is always a last resort and should not be
undertaken without a reasonable prospect for success. To claim that war is a “last
resort” is to assert that the situation is desperate. But it does not make sense, in a
truly desperate situation, to select one’s strategies by appeal to popular opinion polls
or the guiding principle that one’s own soldiers ought under no circumstances to be
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harmed, even at the price of non-combatant lives. Yet precisely such considerations
seem to have guided NATO strategists who refrained from deploying ground troops
in the 1999 bombing campaign in Kosovo. By refusing to risk the lives of military
personnel, strategists may significantly decrease the probability of success, making
it far more likely that the entire mission will have been otiose or that the outcome
will be worse than had they done nothing at all. In other words, while in the just war
framework a war may sometimes be waged supererogatorily, it would seem that
once war has been waged, the required jus in bello observation of non-combatant
immunity precludes the deployment of means that decrease soldier casualties at the
cost of civilian lives.
Interventionism as Consistent Utilitarianism?
When leaders speak in utilitarian terms, they focus primarily on the net outcome
for their own nations. As administrators, it is the primary professional duty of
national leaders to be solicitous of their own citizenry. The possibility of
“humanitarian intervention” might thus seem simply to require that leaders be less
chauvinistic “utilitarians” than is ordinary. For example, United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan’s mandate that powerful nations be more consistent in their
interventions, rather than becoming involved only when their own interests are at
stake, is a call to view all human beings as members of a world community
(Williams, 2000). According to Annan’s cosmopolitan picture, what really matters
is the outcome for humanity, not simply the net outcome for one’s own countrymen.
If every life is equal to every other life, then a leader should not be more willing to
fight wars abroad simply because his own nation’s civilian population will be at
little risk during the conflict. Civilians are always at risk of death in modern war,
but in a consistent utilitarian framework, according to which one’s place of birth is
morally irrelevant, the members of one’s own community should not be prioritized
to the members of other communities. Assuming that moral persons are human
beings, one should not weigh more heavily one subset of humanity than another,
even if one happens to be a national leader.
Precisely because national self-interest does not appear to be lurking behind the
official (public) justification for military missions classified as “humanitarian”,
actions such as that carried out in Kosovo by NATO seem less suspect to some
liberals. Many people who vehemently opposed the Gulf War were not so averse to
(and some even supported) NATO’s 1999 campaign in Kosovo, for its rationale
appeared untainted by morally dubious ulterior motives. But, in retrospect, it seems
difficult to reconcile the allegedly benevolent intentions of the attackers with their
modus operandi. Non-combatant deaths and massive damage to civilian structures
were directly effected by NATO during a campaign allegedly initiated to assist the
Kosovars. If NATO was concerned with the plight of the people of Kosovo, then
why were areas densely populated with civilians bombed? Why did ground troops
not directly confront the enemy soldiers whose actions the campaign was
supposedly intended to stop? Why did NATO reduce to rubble so much of the
infrastructure of these people’s society? If the purpose of bombing “dual targets”
such as bridges, power plants, and radio stations was to demoralize the civilian
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population to the point that they would rise up against Yugoslav President
Milosevic, then was not NATO using the civilians of Kosovo as means to its own
military and political ends? Unalloyed benevolence does not obviously cohere with
the type of insouciance regarding civilian casualty risk that attends the bombing of
city centers.
Those who deny the legitimacy of “supererogatory wars” maintain that, because
all military missions result in the deaths of people who might not otherwise have
died, in “humanitarian interventions”, military personnel should be held to even
higher standards than usual when it comes to non-combatant immunity. One
“usual” standard involves “the doctrine of double effect”, by appeal to which just
war theorists have for centuries interpreted the requirement of proportionality. In
this view, unintended though foreseen deaths of persons officially immune from
attack are permissible so long as they are not disproportionate to the moral end to be
achieved. The other “usual” standard is provided by utilitarianism: the outcome of a
morally permissible action must represent a net improvement in the overall state of
affairs for all those concerned. Perhaps a “higher than usual standard” would
combine the two requirements, but, again, some would say that the proportionality
constraint of just war theory already embodies the utilitarian concern with
consequences.
That military forms of “humanitarian intervention” must be especially observant
of non-combatant immunity would seem to imply that an outside nation should be
inclined to eschew intervention except in worse case scenarios (a position defended
by Walzer and others). But, in the utilitarian picture, a life is a life. There is no extra
value attached to non-combatant life, nor any reason to think that it is somehow
intrinsically worse to kill a civilian than a soldier. Because utilitarianism does not
accommodate our ordinary notion of “supererogation”, military intervention is
never optional in a consistent utilitarian view. Only one action maximizes the utility
of the greatest number, so any particular action either is obligatory, or it is
forbidden. In a given set of circumstances, a leader will be morally obliged either to
wage war or to refrain from doing so. Correlatively, a particular policy within a
campaign, such as the decision of NATO leaders not to deploy ground troops in
Kosovo, either is permissible, which is to say obligatory, or it is forbidden. If the
refusal to deploy ground troops resulted in a less than optimum outcome, then that
policy was simply wrong.
“Humanitarian Interests”
In contrast to utilitarianism, just war theory provides a framework for defending
not the moral obligation, but the moral permissibility of waging war. Nonetheless,
during times of war, the rhetoric of justice becomes hyperbolic and the aspersion of
the enemy nearly always absolute. It appears obvious to many that it is permissible
to combat “Hitler”, the task remaining only to show how obligatory war has
become. Because the permissibility of fighting “Hitler” seems so patent, war
opponents often strike war advocates as ridiculous, certainly confused, if not
downright immoral. Along such lines, one might claim that, in prospective cases of
“humanitarian intervention”, even where the economic interests and integrity of
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one’s own community are not in jeopardy, a broader set of “vital interests”, on the
part of humanity, may be involved. Human beings should not be in the business of
killing other human beings, and least of all as matters of institutional policy on a
large scale. Thus all nations have interests at stake in preventing and halting the
murderous policies of criminal regimes. Advocates of military intervention insist
that recourse to deadly force is sometimes necessary. When the very existence of an
ethnic or religious group hangs in the balance, outsiders may feel that they cannot
simply stand by. The credibility of this stance might seem to fly in the face of the
habitual refusal on the part of first world nations to intervene in notorious cases
such as Rwanda. “Humanitarian interest” rationales also seem prima facie
inconsistent with the refusal on the part of wealthy nations to provide significant aid
to countries whose inhabitants succumb far more often to starvation, illness and
natural calamities (such as floods, earthquakes and freezes) than to death by murder.
Why should it be morally obligatory to save people from each other but not from
non-human foes such as droughts, disease, famine and other natural disasters?
Those who morally distinguish man-made from natural disaster reason that death
by murder is a direct result of volitional human action. In contrast, the mere lack of
food, medicine, potable water, shelter, etc., is not attributable to malevolence on the
part of human beings, and this is why instances of the former, but not the latter,
involve “vital humanitarian interests” and thus necessitate intervention. Drawing
such a distinction between artifactual and natural disaster is certainly the most
charitable way of explaining what may appear to be inconsistent behavior on the
part of nations far more willing to provide assistance in the form of deadly weapons
than in the form of life sustaining food, water, and medicine. For example, the
attitude of U. S. leaders vis-à-vis the AIDS epidemic in Africa can be understood
along these lines. In this view, AIDS is a non-human enemy, so, although the entire
continent of Africa is being ravaged by the disease, U.S. leaders have not felt
obliged to offer significant assistance to combat and prevent the spread of the
disease beyond its own national borders. The moral import of the distinctions
between (1) man-made and natural catastrophe and (2) killing and letting die is
crucial to any plausible defense of the United States’ relative insouciance toward the
plight of the people of Africa during the AIDS era.
Utilitarianism effectively denies the distinction between killing and letting die. A
death is a death, no matter how it transpired. Utilitarianism would also appear not to
distinguish between human and non-human generated disaster. Disaster is disaster,
culminating in the loss of life. The origin of disaster is morally irrelevant. What
matters, according to utilitarians, is that utility be maximized through one’s
response to disaster. Accordingly, it is unclear that a utilitarian can coherently
support destructive military intervention (or the provision of deadly weapons to
other groups) while neglecting to provide other forms of positive aid, for what
matters, at the end of the day, is whether or not utility has been maximized. If a
given amount of money provided in the form of medicine would save more lives
than an equivalent amount of money provided in the form of bombs, then the
consistent utilitarian must opt for the former rather than the latter allocation.
The distinction between killing and letting die, though rejected by utilitarians, is
widely affirmed in our ordinary moral practices and crucial to just war theorists’
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explanations of the moral permissibility of “collateral damage” (Calhoun, 2001c).
Because military means of “humanitarian intervention” effect the premature deaths
of human beings, defending such missions may require that we forsake our ordinary
distinction between killing and letting die. On the one hand, in civil society, we
uphold the moral significance of this distinction. On the other hand, during wartime,
advocates of military forms of “humanitarian intervention” relax the distinction,
sometimes going so far as to characterize war opponents as “cowardly”,
“incoherent”, or even “immoral” for failing to intervene to stop the slaughter of
people by criminal regimes. But advocates of military intervention often seem to
want to have it both ways, insisting that military action, which will (in the modern
world) result in the deaths of innocent people, is sometimes necessary, while
denying that positive assistance is morally obligatory in other sorts of cases. Is this
position consistent?
The Importance of Intentions
In civil society we sharply distinguish positive cases of killing from negative
cases of omission, wherein an agent refrains from helping. Parents and physicians
are exceptions, for they have extra obligations to attend to the needs of children and
patients. But even physicians and parents have incurred special obligations only to
their own patients and/or own children, not to all of the people or children of the
world. The simplest way of understanding the importance we ascribe to this
distinction is that positive action is presumed to reflect a positive intention, while
negative omission is presumed merely to evidence a lack of intention. In cases of
negligence and malpractice, agents are held culpable for deaths resulting from their
failure to attend (positively) to the needs of victims to whom they are specially
related.
Moral relativist Gilbert Harman (2000) offers an alternative explanation for our
ordinary distinction between killing and letting die (or negative and positive duties),
viz., that morality is purely conventional, arrived at through a process of sometimes
overt but usually tacit “bargaining”. A requirement not to harm would benefit both
the rich and the poor, but a requirement to provide positive assistance would benefit
the poor at the expense of the rich. Harman regards the existence of this distinction
in our ordinary morality as evidence for the thesis of moral relativism. However,
unlike Harman, those who defend the recourse to deadly force on moral grounds
operate under the assumption that moral absolutism is true (Calhoun, 2001a).
In the just war framework, the distinction between “collateral damage” and “war
crime”, mutually exclusive interpretations of positive and deadly actions, can only
inhere in the intentions of the agents involved. The “doctrine of double effect” is a
test for the moral permissibility of the “collateral damage” killings brought about
during a war. According to the doctrine of double effect, non-combatants may never
be targeted, either directly or indirectly as a means to another objective, but
sometimes non-combatants may be killed, as an unintended though perhaps
foreseen side effect. So, for example, if an elementary school is situated in the
vicinity of a crucial military target, then bombing the military target may still be
permissible, though doing so will in all probability result in the destruction of the
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school and the deaths of numerous innocent children and teachers. In contrast, the
doctrine of double effect would not sanction the direct targeting of the school,
because non-combatants are immune from attack. Controversial cases arise when
so-called “dual” targets, such as electrical power plants, radio stations, oil refineries
and even water treatment plants are positively targeted during a war, as some of
these were in Kosovo and all of these were in Iraq. What might “non-combatant
immunity” mean, if densely populated civilian areas and structures basic to civil
society are regarded by military strategists and spokesmen as legitimate targets?
Other people’s intentions are ultimately inaccessible. Accordingly, utilitarian
analyses of the rightness or wrongness of human actions are in one way
straightforward, for they do not require the divination of any actor’s intentions. As
one example, consider U. S. President Truman’s atomic bombing of Japan in 1945.
When Truman bombed Hiroshima, what did he intend? It might be difficult to
imagine how a leader could deploy an atomic bomb in a location densely populated
with civilians without in some sense intending that those within the radius of
destruction be affected. Understandably, then, Truman apologists invoke
utilitarianism in their explanations of his action. Difficult though it may have been,
say Truman’s defenders, the deployment of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima actually
saved human lives by bringing the conflict to a relatively swift conclusion rather
than permitting protracted conventional bombings to continue on both sides. Is the
utilitarian vindication of Truman correct? Retrospectively, utilitarian defenses
always rest upon speculative historical counterfactual conditionals. Things might
have been worse, or they might have been better. Which would they have been, had
Truman not done what he did?
Utilitarian rationales are equally dependent upon projections of multi-variable
functions when planning for the future. Will a prospective action ameliorate or
exacerbate the current situation? Because the utility of an action is a function of the
desires, beliefs and values of many different people, utilitarian calculations may
seem to require supra-human abilities (indeed, omniscience) even in the more local
and seemingly unproblematic cases. To confound matters, how the world will be
affected by one's own actions is crucially dependent upon how other persons are
acting simultaneously. The net utility of an action is determined by a nexus of
factors, including actions performed by a variety of agents. Still, after the fact,
interpretations of military actions often take on a utilitarian cast, as in the defense of
Truman sketched above. Sheer numbers of human lives are usually regarded as a
crude proxy for utility, for only living agents can be the repositories of utility. Due
to the seemingly intractable epistemological problems associated with
utilitarianism, some of the theory’s defenders have proposed amendments such as
defining “right actions” as those which can be reasonably foreseen to maximize the
utility of the greatest number. If ought implies can, then no one could be required to
do the impossible, so in assessing the morality of an action, what should matter is
the agent’s intention to maximize utility.
Thus, superficial appearance to the contrary, the importance accorded intentions
in moral matters need not diminish through affirming utilitarianism. Indeed, the
typical utilitarian defense of Truman may well be parasitic upon a prior assumption
regarding his moral intentions. Even those who condemn Truman’s actions in Japan
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do not generally think that his primary intention was to cause thousands of innocent
people to suffer and die. Nor did Truman intend to cause birth defects in the next
generation of Japanese. Only under the assumption that Truman intended to stop the
war would one be inclined to defend Truman along utilitarian lines. Assuming that
Truman was not simply a mass murderer tout court (who would have bombed
Hiroshima even if Japan had already surrendered), the harm that Truman wreaked
upon the Japanese people was an unfortunate “side-effect” of his moral intention to
stop the war. Of course, the problem with using intentions to dispel moral
culpability for the deaths in which military actions result, is that the same logic
applies to both sides of most conflicts. The doctrine of double effect insists upon the
relevance of intentions in ascribing moral culpability for the deaths of other people,
but when military personnel kill on command, their leaders have invariably
characterized the deaths as mandates of justice. There may be rare cases in which an
agent himself claims to be doing evil for the sake of evil, but far more frequently
agents pursue what they take to be a good end through what they acknowledge are
unsavory though necessary means. War thus construed is an instance of the more
general “problem of dirty hands”, the alleged incompatibility of moral and
administrative excellence. Consistent utilitarians reject “dirty hands” analyses as
delusive, on the grounds that one’s moral obligations are univocal. If by waging war
a leader will bring about a better net set of consequences, then it matters not, in the
utilitarian picture, that doing so will culminate in the deaths of some innocent
people.
War Opponents and Double Effect
Military forms of “humanitarian intervention” are alleged by some to be morally
obligatory under certain circumstances. One assumption made in accusing war
opponents of “immorality” is that it is impermissible not to help those in need, that
to fail to react is to capitulate to evil (Johnson, 1984). Even in the limiting case,
where the pacifist refuses to fight back when personally attacked, critics claim that,
by refusing to defend himself, the pacifist surrenders to evil. But, strikingly, the
very doctrine of double effect so frequently invoked by military spokesmen to
absolve their personnel from culpability for “collateral damage” deaths serves
equally well to absolve pacifists from any responsibility for the deaths to which
their inaction might be said to lead. The pacifist intends not to capitulate to evil but,
rather, to not kill human beings. In other words, if intentions are constitutive of
morality, then the war advocate has no real case against the pacifist. (Interestingly
enough, St. Augustine himself, arguably the father of just war theory, considered
killing in literal self-defense to be impermissible, a manifestation of covetous
attachment to terrestrial life.)
War opponents naturally reject the insinuation that their inaction is causally
connected to the deaths effected by other agents. The causal nexus is far too
complex and their own threads to the deaths much too tenuous to ascribe
responsibility to war opponents for other people’s acts of killing. Moreover, if the
murderers suddenly decided not to kill their victims, the pacifist’s plan of action
would in no way be altered. The pacifist “intends” the negative consequences of
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refusing to fight back neither as an end nor as the means to the deaths brought about
by other agents. In other words, the deaths said by some war advocates to “result”
from the pacifist’s inaction are, at the very worst, a form of “collateral damage”
(Holmes, 1989). Perhaps if the war opponent does nothing, then a murderer will kill
innocent human beings. But the pacifist cannot (reasonably) be held responsible for
and surely ought not to bear the burden of the existence of evil in the world. If ought
implies can, then no one could be morally obliged to prevent all of the people of the
world from being killed, for no one is capable of doing that. Strikingly, the very
framework by which just war theorists defend actions resulting in the foreseen
though unintended deaths of innocent people, simultaneously exonerates the
pacifist. If “humanitarian intervention” is best construed as supererogatory, then the
pacifist is nonetheless vindicated, merely declining to fight where the just war
theorist allows that it is permitted.
Pro-military champions of sovereignty may retort that defending one’s self and
one’s fellow citizens is a special case, since one has special connections to these
people and, therefore, relational duties to them, on analogy to the cases of the parent
and the physician. Such a position would seem to be unsound in a consistent
utilitarian framework, if it is true (as is plausible) that where one happens to have
been born is morally irrelevant. And surely no one is morally obliged to support the
local regime in power simply because it is the local regime in power. Counter
examples such as Nazi Germany leap immediately to mind. Obviously, if the
leaders of one’s nation are evil, then the last thing that one should do is support
them. But, given that all criminal leaders lie to their people, one really has no way
of knowing, contemporaneously, whether one’s current leaders are criminals or not.
Tragically, the leaders most adept at molding the information to which their
citizenry are provided access may well be the most criminal of all. Even under the
assumption that the distinction between just and unjust wars can be made, we know
from history that all leaders rally their troops by claiming to have justice on their
side. Accordingly, a pacifist may quite rationally reject all calls to war on the
grounds that at least half of all rationales offered by leaders throughout history have
been duplicitous or confused. If it is always wrong to kill human beings, then no
leader’s call to war should ever be heeded by anyone.
War Opponents as Long-Range Utilitarians
Due to the nature of weapons and the structures of societies in the modern world,
military interventions result in the deaths of people who would live were it not for
the willingness of other people to opt for the use of military force in circumstances
of crisis. Perhaps the most significant distinction between war advocates and
opponents is the breadth of their vision of history. Calls to arms satisfy an
immediate desire to take action and effect a swift solution to a difficult conflict. But
the swiftest solution is seldom the best solution. In order to fashion a response that
will have some chance of improving rather than aggravating the situation, one must
assess the events and circumstances leading up to the present crisis. How did the
world become such a murderous place?
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A long-range utilitarian recognizes the ultimate inefficacy of “quick fixes” and
the masking of symptoms with no attention to root causes of deadly strife. The
dictum “violence breeds violence” succinctly expresses the long-range utilitarian’s
concern that the last way to put a halt to killing is to engage in yet more killing.
Likely consequences of the recourse to deadly force by powerful nations are not
difficult to predict. Bombing campaigns create new victims who view themselves as
unjustly harmed and often seek revenge. The use of deadly force by nations serves
as a highly visible example of what are supposedly appropriate means to conflict
resolution. In this way, military campaigns perpetuate and reinforce the view that
killing is sometimes required in the name of morality, a view, which is of course,
shared by factional terrorists and vigilante killers. By deploying military means,
nations also frustrate progress toward the establishment of an effective international
war crimes tribunal for the prosecution of criminal leaders. Finally, and, most
importantly of all, military states produce and distribute weapons internationally,
thus concomitantly empowering (indeed, creating) future potential despots.
Unfortunately, these sorts of utilitarian considerations are virtually never entertained
by policy makers during times of conflict. Leaders galvanize support for their wars
by appealing to short-term consequences, usually in conjunction with claims about
the injustices committed by their adversaries.
From the perspective of a long-range utilitarian, military missions are “quick
fixes” in that they bring to a halt conflicts presumed to be situated in a limited time
and space coordinate. But apparently isolated conflicts never occur in a vacuum and
have consequences that invariably ramify in many directions and well into the
future. Military actions are preceded by events that led one group to cross over the
proverbial “line”, beyond what another group will tolerate. Given the default
proscription to intentional killing within society, no military campaign considered
out of context could withstand a moral analysis. While the results of a “just war”
analysis require consideration of the stated cause of a military mission (in addition
to an assessment of the other requirements of jus ad bellum), the results of a
utilitarian analysis depend entirely upon the length of time over which one reflects
upon history. In actual practice, it is nearly always presumed to be the time of the
act of destruction or mass murder immediately preceding the violent retaliation
currently being defended. But consider, for example, the plight of Iraqi civilians in
the aftermath of the Gulf War. To some it seems quite difficult to understand (much
less justify) “the silent war” of more than a decade that continues to victimize
innocent people, and which is said to have been provoked by an act of naked
aggression ordered in 1990 by Saddam Hussein, a dictator. Tragically, many of the
recent victims of U.S. policies in Iraq were not even born at the time of Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Orders of magnitude more people were destroyed by
the response to what was deemed “naked aggression”, than by the invasion of
Kuwait itself.
Concluding Remarks
People often appeal to utilitarianism when retrospectively defending military
actions such as Truman’s bombing of Hiroshima. However, utilitarian defenses of
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recourse to deadly force do not fare well when a broader time slice of history is
considered. In addition, while most people seem to accept the distinctions between
(1) natural and manmade disaster and (2) killing and letting die, these distinctions
are untenable in the utilitarian picture. Military supporters are more than willing to
forsake our ordinary distinction between killing and letting die when it comes to
responding to the conduct of a criminal regime, often insisting that the use of deadly
force is morally required. But rarely do military supporters so enthusiastically
advocate the provision of life-sustaining resources to the people of other lands in
crisis. Yet it is obvious that food, water, clothing, shelter and medicine tend to
sustain the lives of people, in stark contrast to bombs, which terminate human lives
and destroy the fruits of human labor. Although the epistemological problems with
utilitarianism are ultimately insoluble, it can hardly be denied that the bombs are
inherently destructive of life and property, while food, water, clothing, shelter and
medicine are not.
A multitude of economic and political forces conspire to shape foreign policy
and impel leaders to engage their nations in war. Not unrelated to the distinction
between manmade and natural catastrophe is the fact that most of the weapons in
existence were exported by first world nations (the leading exporter being the
United States) to less powerful and, more importantly, less stable nations. It is
essential to recognize that criminal dictators are not born but made. Until
empowered, no person can commit crimes against humanity. An inductive analysis
of the wars of the twentieth century leads one quite reasonably to predict that
exported weapons will at some point be used to murder human beings. Accordingly,
one way of gauging the sincerity of nations involved in allegedly “humanitarian
interventions” such as occurred in Kosovo in 1999 would be to examine their own
policies regarding weapons exports. Massive amounts of money are allocated by
powerful nations to the production of deadly weapons, all in the name of morality.
But surely many cases of starvation and disease could be prevented through the
simple redirection of military resources. The provision of medical assistance to
combat AIDS in Africa would seem to be one case where redirection of resources
might eventually save millions of lives. The fact that nations such as the United
States are so loath to offer assistance in any form other than military destruction
provides some evidence for the claim that apparent cases of disinterested
intervention are really self-serving, when all is said and done.
Although major weapons exporters do not typically (at least not wittingly)
provide their declared enemies (and associated allies) with weapons, it is
indisputable that regimes remain in existence, on average, for shorter periods of
time than do stockpiled weapons. Furthermore, international allegiances ebb and
flow with the changing political climate. Because the weapons supplied to a given
regime will be transferred to (or appropriated by) the successor regime of a nation,
the only way to avoid aiding and abetting a future regime is to halt the transfer of
weapons across national borders (Calhoun, 2001b). Unfortunately, little work
toward “humanitarian intervention” is done along preventative lines. Rather,
powerful nations tend to wait until massive havoc has broken out before considering
the possibility of retaliatory bombing. But surely the best way to minimize the
probability of slaughters by future regimes would be to halt the exportation of
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weapons today. What could be less objectionable than to prevent the creation of
future criminal dictators? The tragic irony of weapons commerce in the
contemporary world is that the figures who evolve into enemies of human rights
were supported, either directly or indirectly, by the international community during
the formative phases of their military careers.
War results in the deaths of people who often have nothing to do with the crimes
allegedly justifying violent retaliation. Although the moral permissibility of
“national self-defense” is uncritically accepted as a justification for massive military
expenditures, in reality, the modern means of “rescue” deployed during times of
crisis are bombs, the effects of which are purely nocent. To interpret ghastly acts of
destruction such as the demolition of water treatment facilities (with long-term
ramifications for civilian life) as strategies of “self-defense” stretches credulity.
While according to just war theorists intentions are crucial, virtually any action can
be interpreted as permissible, provided only that it be construed as the “collateral
damage” to a good end. The doctrine of double effect forgives Truman and Bush,
but Hitler, Hussein, and factional terrorists no less.
Finally, to accept the doctrine of double effect, as any just war theorist
concerned about defending the legitimacy of war in the modern world, is
simultaneously to vindicate the categorical opposition to war championed by
pacifists. By reacting with violence to the acts of the murderous tyrant, war
advocates capitulate to evil, their own actions having become purely reactive. War
advocates (whether just war theorist or utilitarian) allow the criminal regime to
transform them into killers (or accomplices). In contrast, pacifists refuse altogether
to descend to the level of the killers. Accordingly, pacifists have no need to indulge
in the self-delusive casuistry of “double effect” rationalization of killings foreseen
though unintended. War opponents categorically refuse to permit killers to mold
them in their own image. Pacifists alone uphold the motivating premise of
absolutism, that the killing of human beings is morally forbidden. The morally highminded war advocate’s resort to deadly force is aptly characterized by the war
opponent as follows: “The road to hell is paved with good intentions”.
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THE ISLAMIC PARADIGM OF NATIONS:
TOWARD A NEO-CLASSICAL APPROACH

Amr G.E. Sabet
Introduction
As late as 1966, Martin Wight could still pose the question: “why is there no
international relations theory?” By this he meant the absence of a tradition of
speculation about relations between states, family of nations, or the international
community, comparable to that of political theory as speculation about the state. To
the extent that it did exist, it was marked by “intellectual and moral poverty”
caused both by the prejudice imposed by the sovereign state and the belief in
progress (Wight 1995: 15-16 &19). Unlike political theory, which has been
progressivist in its concern with pursuing interests of state as “theory of the good
life”, international politics as the “theory of survival” constituted the “realm of
recurrence and repetition” (Wight 1995: 25 & 32). Essentially, therefore, it had
nothing new to offer.
This challenging viewpoint spawned a dynamic of intellectual activities, which
by the 1990s had enriched the discipline of international relations in ways earlier
unforeseen. The assumptions of repetitiveness and recurrences, which had hindered
the field’s potential for expansion and risked limiting its horizons, were contested.
No longer was the field constrained by a preoccupation with state survival or lack
of appropriate concepts with which to theorize about global politics. The discipline
drew on advancements in the cognate fields of social and political theory, which
opened new horizons of theoretical unfolding. It became sufficiently enriched and
diversified to be able to challenge claims to a “consensually recognized or
determined” nature of world politics and to overcome conceptual paucity and
rigidity (Burchill & Linklater 1993: 7-8).
Much of what Wight had indicated in the 1960s may not be as pertinent to the
current state of Western international theory, given the gamut of intellectual
developments that have taken place since. In surpassing the simplicity of earlier
approaches, the field, in fact, became a victim of its own success. Well into the
1990s it continues to suffer from a lack of an authoritative paradigm on the one
hand, and a confusing array of proliferating paradigms on the other (Holsti 1985: 17). Nevertheless, the dynamism exhibited in addressing these contentions reflected
a positive attitude toward problem solving, the highlighting of which could perhaps
inspire similar outlooks among constituents of diverse cultures.
Alternatively, there appears to be a continued streak of relevance in this caveat
as far as a potential Islamic theoretical counterpart is concerned. Since classical
times around the 8th century AD onwards, the Islamic paradigm of law
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of nations basically divided the world into two opposing domains. One constituted
the abode of Islam (dar al-Islam or Pax Islamica), comprising the “sovereign”
Islamic State ruling over both Muslims and protected non-Muslim communities
(See Fig. 1).
Fig. 1

dar al-harb

conflict/war

dar al-Islam

Fig. 1 represents the simple classical Islamic Theory dividing the world
into the two broad categories of abode of Islam and abode of War (harb).

The other, falling beyond the pale of Pax Islamica, represented the abode of war
(dar al-harb) (Khadduri 1966: 11). This law of nations was not considered to be
separate from the broader aspects of Islamic jurisprudence, but rather as an
extension of the Shari’ah or sacred law. As it developed over time and found its
full expression under the Abbasid Dynasty (750-1258 AD), it came to acquire some
kind of “sacrosanct soundness” as part of the Shari’ah itself (Al-Ghunaimi 1969:
133). Hence it made no clear distinction between the sources and sanctions of
domestic or municipal law, and the analogous categories pertaining to external
relations (Khadduri 1966: 6).1 Islamic external outlook, thus, came to be
persistently based on perceptions of foreign relations as guided and heavily
influenced by a religiously based “domestic analogy” (Suganami 1989: 9). This
was natural given the universality of Islam, and the fact that dar al-harb was not
recognized on an equal footing as legitimate or sovereign. It was the territory yet to
be brought from the “state of nature” into the fold of the Divine (Khadduri 1966:
13).
This static view had much to do with the Islamic paradigm’s religio-legalistic
foundation. Since absolute moral values rarely change, theory acquired
metaphysical dimensions. Elevated to the religio-moral level, theory lost its
essential cognitive characteristics. Despite obvious and unrelenting transformations
in the nature and structure of the global system, the classical paradigm endures as
the realm of recurrence and repetition. Yet it continues to shape and influence
Muslim consciousness, even as it increasingly comes under heavy strains. To what
limits, though, could it sustain such influence, in the face of a starkly inhospitable
global reality, and, without reinstating the cognitive aspects, has become a question
of importance.
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Its “analogous” structure further raises questions as to the extent it is possible to
develop an Islamic theory of international relations without having first redelineated this relationship. According to one view expressed by F. L. Oppenheim,
“international” law assimilated by a domestic legal system beyond a certain
demarcation is likely to contradict its essential qualities. Once crossing a threshold,
it would cease being “international” law, as the medium through which relations
are conducted between sovereign nations (Suganami 1989: 67). The dilemma this
poses for Islamic jurisprudence is obvious. In conducting relations with nonMuslim de facto, though not necessarily de jure, “sovereignties”, whose law is to
govern and set the conditions of interaction? To disrupt the inside/outside
continuum is to subordinate sacred imperatives to positivist or non-Islamic values.
This remains the case even where values may overlap, as the sanctioning source
must continue, in principal, to occupy a super-ordinate position. Thus, the basic
structure of the paradigm does not allow for conducting foreign relations, and if
any sustained relations are to be conducted, the paradigm is rendered inapplicable.
Nevertheless, only limited and un-systematized speculation about expanding the
theory’s horizons has been pursued, allowing it to be judged by some Muslim
scholars, perhaps hastily, as practically anachronistic and irrelevant (Sulayman
1993: 61 & 97).
The purpose of this paper is to introduce new elements of dynamism into the
theory’s static structure and hence contribute to reconstructing and reexamining its
possible relevance as a neo-classical conceptual device. This highly needed
“therapy” for theoretical irrelevance aims at restoring “intelligibility” and
“awareness” of the theory, and at founding a new, cleaned-up basis for conceptual
and methodological construction and formation (Sartori 1984: 50). Ability to
conceptualize is a prerequisite for any possible shift from being simply an object of
world politics toward being a subject and a participant. Only subsequently, would it
be possible to re-establish the significance of the Islamic theory of law of nations
as a religious, ideological and political regime in the service of policies and
strategies which touch upon world events. The purpose is to provide a guide for
“knowledgeable practices”, constitutive of “subjects”, as reflectivists in the field of
international relations would normally put it (Wendt 1992: 392).
Conceptual and Theoretical Issues
To conceptualize is to understand. “‘Understanding’…means…having whatever
ideas and concepts are needed to recognize that a great many different phenomena
are part of a coherent whole” (Heisenberg 1971: 33). This involves a series of
processes by which theoretical matrices achieve a significant measure of relative
consensus and comprehension in any particular community. Conceptualization, in
other words, allows for undergoing the theoretical process by which advancement
from the level of abstract ideas or constructs toward policy development and
application can be made. It guards against confusion and ad hoc decision-making,
and serves to set and sustain subsequent policies within a congruous strategic
framework. It follows, therefore, that a lack of conception or of a conceptual
reference entails a lack of and inability to understand or comprehend. It further
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means that the ability to tackle the flow of information becomes acutely diminished,
and so is the capacity to judge or make decisions of a strategic nature. Failing to
process information pre-empts the competence to act.
In discussing matters of strategy and war, B. H. Liddell Hart emphasized the
crucial importance of conception as a guiding principle in peace and/or conflict. He
underscored that distracting the mind and expectations of opponents deprived them
of their freedom of action as a sequel to their loss of freedom of conception (Liddell
Hart 1967: 341-342). The effectiveness of a strategic vision depends more “on the
ability to paralyze an enemy’s action rather than the theoretical object of crushing
his forces” (Liddell Hart 1967: 341-346). Such was the significance that in many
instances of strategic or grand-strategic contestation, it took only conceptual
maneuvering to determine a winning or losing outcome. Fighting became secondary
or redundant as opponents lost their sense of self-representation and consequently
changed their purpose, consciously or otherwise. Conception and strategy in the
logic of this argument composed two mutually consolidating and fortifying
constituents of reality. The absence of one almost invariably undermined the other.
The same underlying principles apply to matters, cultural and religious. Whereas
Liddell Hart stressed the organic relationship between conception and strategy in
the military realm, Edward Said highlighted the corresponding categories of culture
and imperialism in the intellectual-ideological domain. The connection between the
two categories rested on the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from
forming and emerging. Cultural narratives reflected conceptual constructions
which, from opposite vantages, justified or condemned imperial domination.
Predators and preys became narrations in and of themselves, each in their own way
(Said 1993: xiii). The very grand narratives of emancipation and enlightenment
produced by the colonial predators served to mobilize colonized people against
their former dominators, and herein were unveiled their inherent contradictions.
Yet, in adopting the very idioms of their colonial masters, the population actually
culminated in perpetuating and reproducing the very power relations of those
narratives, and therein revealed the dynamic consistencies of imperial discourse.
Out of these combined and seemingly paradoxical manifestations, loss of
conception led to strategic disarray, cultural/religious dissipation and hegemonic
resurgence. Commensurately, imperial repression invited the return of the repressed
(Sayyid 1997: 3). Counter eruptions categorized under the rubric of “religious
nationalism” were the most conspicuous result (Juergensmeyer 1993). In its
inflamed exposition, this took the form of both random and/or organized violence.
In its more sober reflection, it induced a renaissance like intellectual effort which
aimed both at re-instating and re-examining a people’s own identity, thought,
history and experience. At the heart of this effort is a concern, under constraints and
conditions of globalization and uncertainty, with the nature of the interaction
between and among diverse cultures, religions and consciousness.
There is a commonality of concerns and issues among humanity at large, yet the
diversity of priorities, agendas, interests and above all consciousness and
worldviews, find their expression in different narratives or conceptual schemes.
These refer to the manifold “languages” used in expressing, representing and
reflecting collectivities’ distinct ways of perceiving or thinking about the world and
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of “ordering” the “data” of experience. People with different conceptual schemes
are frequently concerned with the same properties of objects or with corresponding
data. The “given” though, is “somehow ‘organized’, ‘ordered’, ‘interpreted’,
differently” (Walton 1973: 1 & 3). The “givens” of international and global issues
are no exception. Both classical Islamic and Western traditions regarding relations
among nations were largely cognizant of analogous matters. This could be observed
from the early treatise (siyar) of the 8th century Muslim jurist Muhammad bin alHasan al-Shaybani (750-804 AD),2 through Hugo Grotious, down to contemporary
Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. Broadly speaking, common themes which
animated juristic and intellectual interests in the subject, revolved around three
overlapping considerations: 1) the causes and justifications of war and the
conditions of peace, security, and order; 2) power and position as an/the essential
actor (units of analysis) in the community of nations; 3) conceptions and images of
the international system and of the role of the “state” in that system (Holsti 1985:
8). These considerations of power and politics came to be largely articulated in the
modern Western theory of (neo)realism. However, embedded in an Islamic
theoretical counterpart, an alternative conceptual categorization is rendered
essential in order to depict the ensuing substantive differences.
For this purpose, Abdel-Rahman bin Khaldun (1332-1406 AD), a Muslim
philosopher of history, sociologist and political theorist, and his concept of
assabiyya may be of significant help.3 He identified three broad types of regimes.
They reflected different forms of domestic leaderships: 1) a government/leadership
based solely on natural social solidarity (assabiyya as unmitigated power); 2) a
government/leadership based on reason and natural law in conjunction with
assabiyya and 3) a government/leadership based on Divine Law (Shari’ah), again in
conjunction with assabiyya (Mahdi 1963: 263). Within those three regime
typologies, assabiyya figures prominently in all, while the rational and religious
dimensions are introduced in the second and third classifications respectively.
Should the purpose of assabiyya or core leadership mitigated by reason, be solely
concerned with the worldly or mundane good of both the rulers and their subjects,
then this polity would fall under what Ibn Khaldun termed as rational regimes.
Should, however, the religious dimension be introduced such that the leadership is
concerned as well with the good of the subjects in the hereafter (akhira), then a
Regime of Law (Shari’ah) unfolds as the superior order of existence. The latter
regime, according to Ibn Khaldun, is superior since its purpose is to maintain a
balance between both life dimensions providing for moderation against excessive
mundanity. Above all, it becomes a community (Umma) upon which God’s favor
and pleasure is bestowed (Sabet 1994: 587).
In light of this Khaldunian classification and in extension into the international
domain, realism and neo-realism would fall under the category of rational regimes,
and not too infrequently, under that of pure domination. Classical Islamic theory
would fall under the regime of Law. Like the rational category, the Islamic law of
nations constitutes a way of thinking about the world, a conception of “order”, and
a research program with its own set of assumptions and premises from which
Islamic derivations and arguments can be developed and analyzed (Mustanduno
1999: 19). In contra-distinction, however, it designates an entirely different
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conceptual worldview and moment of history with its own autonomous and
independent discursive engagements. Assabiya, as a corresponding conceptual
device grounded in the regime of Law, constitutes the Islamic theory of nations
what the concepts of power and capability are to realism and structural neorealism.
Whereas “power” serves the purpose of bridging the gap between international
structures and processes, so is the concept of assabiyya crucial in linking
international-global understanding to Islam. Such linkages help incorporate a
religio-political theory about the part that can be “played by conceptions of the
world and their associated values” in bringing about a desired change (Bockock
1986: 83). (Neo)realism and Islamic theory together with their concomitant
concepts of power/capability and assabiyya respectively, do not only comprise
analytical devices, but are in fact constituted and constitutive elements of distinct
philosophical and religious discourses that influence and structure both conceptions
and actions. Rationality/realism and Shari’ah/assabiyya in other words, infuse
power with differentiated substantive bases of action and hence, reflect two
categories of political behavior. The former constitutes “relational power” which
seeks to maximize values, influence behavior and control outcomes from within a
given institutional structure or regime. The latter reflects a “meta-power” concept
and refers to efforts and behavior, which seek to change existing institutional
structures and alter the rules of the game (Krasner 1985: 14).
Assabiyya is rooted in three types or categories of belief structures: 1)
worldviews; 2) principled beliefs and 3) causal beliefs. These embody
cosmological, ontological and ethical notions respectively, rendering them broader
than mere normative outlooks (Goldstein & Keohane 1993: 8-10). Worldviews
merge with peoples’ conceptions of their identity, beliefs and focus of loyalties.
Islamic law or Shari’ah falls in this class, and together with secularism for instance,
comprise two different and largely opposed worldviews. The second category, or
principled beliefs, embraces normative conceptions about values. Frequently,
though not always, they take the form of binary opposites such as justice vs.
injustice, right vs. wrong, falling within the pale vs. falling without, or abode of
Peace vs. abode of War. Principled beliefs interpose between worldviews and
policy outcomes by translating key doctrines into guidance for present human
conduct. This is equivalent to Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh, as the “media of
making the Shari’ah accessible to common believers” (Ghunaimi 1969: 133).4 The
Islamic law of nations constitutes one manifestation of such an exercise. Thus, it
falls short of a totalizing worldview and its full sanctity, but is more than a mere
theoretical construct or policy guideline, to be subjected nonchalantly to allegations
of irrelevance or variability.
Causal beliefs pertain to “cause-effect” relationships based on the opinions or
consensus of members of “recognized elites”, through whom authoritative rulings
or decisions are made. They come closest to being the detailed paradigmatic
judgments or ara’/fatawa (sgl. ra’y/fatwa), of an Islamic epistemic community or
Ulama, the consensus of whom, constitutes ijma’.5 Causal beliefs fall at the
interface between the normative and the cognitive. They entail strategies of
attaining goals “themselves valued because of shared principled beliefs, and
understandable only within the context of broader worldviews outlooks” (Goldstein
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& Keohane 1993:10). Thus, changes in the conceptualization of this latter category
tend to be more flexible and frequent than the former two, which reflect constants
and continuities. All three categories however, constitute a closure based on
symmetric relationships among Shari’ah, fiqh and fatawa, for which assabiyya
becomes the operationalized or cognitive-praxis. What is meant by closure is that
the domain within which the micro is related to the macro, and where political and
strategic insights fit into a larger Islamic whole. Whereas “normative closure
requires symmetrical relations between the components of the system where one
element supports the other and vice versa, cognitive openness … requires
asymmetrical relations between the system and the environment” (Luhmann 1990:
230). Normativity maintains its symmetry by being non-adaptive (i.e. “closed to
information and control”). By linking with a cognitively open framework it could
nevertheless, remain “open to energy” and non-entropy (Ashby 1956: 4). Normative
closure and cognitive openness constitute the systemic self-referential unity of the
reconstructed Islamic theory of nations.
The Modern State as a System of Durable Inequality
Beliefs and ideas play an important tangible, though sometimes less visible, role
in the differing ordering, organization and interpretation of “data”, beyond the mere
justifications of pure interest. By providing order and conception of the world, they
contribute to shaping agendas and programs. Particular ideas and beliefs chosen
rather than others, act as “blinders” or “invisible switchmen” influencing policies
and possibly effecting their transformation. They serve to reduce the number of
conceivable alternatives, and to channel action onto certain tracks while obscuring
others outlooks (Goldstein & Keohane 1993: 12). They can further assist in
unsettling discredited institutional frameworks, old or extant, in favor of alternative
formations (Jackson 1993: 119).
Modern state structures and currently emerging blocs are congruent with
particular international and global designs and their constitutive and/or constituted
interests. They incorporate thus, certain symmetrical ideas, beliefs and concerns
while excluding others. The crucial question from the Islamic theoretical
perspective is who and what has been excluded by international and global
structures, and what role the modern state plays in such exclusion. Ian Clark for
instance, observed that “a theory of the global is itself an integral dimension of a
more plausible theory of state”. Theorizing about the latter structure thus carries us
over the “great divide” between the inside and outside, to how we think about
relations between states. According to this vision, the state is “the common but
contested ground that brings the national and international together, rather than as
the barrier which marks the line of separation between them”(Clark 1999: 17-18).
This is in stark contrast to the power and anarchic assumptions of the realists and
neo-realists, the latter of which, has yielded to the international system a distinctive
and virtually autonomous existence.
Neo-liberals in their turn have come to perceive the state as the instrument
through which external demands of capital flows are imposed on domestic target
groups. This constituted both, a reversal in its earlier role of projecting national
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economic demands into the international system, and an alternative form of
structuralism to that of neo-realism. Instead of the latter’s “anarchic/power
configuration” organization shifts to the “competition/neo-liberalism” of global
economy (Clark 1999: 94). State formation in its modern structural sense further
was attributed by Charles Tilly to war. Demands imposed by violent conflict
promoted the dynamics of state-making processes, which ranged from territorial
consolidation and centralization, to administrative differentiation and monopoly
over the means of coercion. “War made the state”, as he put it, “and the state made
war” (Tilly 1975: 42). In contrast, Ibn Khaldun perceived the rise of the state, as an
outcome of human co-operation rather than anarchy. People co-operate because
they stand to benefit more, and out of such cooperation, which represents the
“human condition”, emerges the state. This human condition is based on reason,
social reproduction and social cohesion or, assabiyya. Unlike Thomas Hobbes, Ibn
Khaldun rejected the “state of nature”, which pit all against all, rendering man
willing to accept tyranny rather than live under conditions of sheer self-help (Pasha
1997: 60).
The purpose here is by no means to present a theory of the state or its origins.
Rather, it is to stress that the concept of the state is both contingent and variable,
simply reflecting the varying empirical realities with which theory and practice
concern themselves (Nettl 1994: 11). “Competing theories of the state, in effect,
invariably come perilously near to being competing ideologies” (Ferguson &
Mansback 1989: 4). To challenge the territoriality of the state thus does not contest
the concept’s abstract necessity. Rather it simply affirms its contingent structural
underpinnings and vested inside/outside interests, and by the same token denies any
inherently “natural” existence of the form that the modern state has taken. The
“universalization” of the “sovereign” equality of states for instance, was a
contingent development based on pressures from newly independent and weak
states hoping to protect their new freedoms, analogies made to domestic politics of
juridical equality, and great power calculations of interest (Krasner 1985: 74). This
suggests that inferences derived in each historical setting about political conduct are
unique (Ferguson & Mansback 1989: 3).
Religio-political re-conceptualization of the modern state as contingent rather
than necessary is a pre-requisite to the effective representation of an updated
Islamic theory of nations, yet one which retains the essential qualities of its classical
antecedent. As a first step this entails the deconstruction of the modern state
concept and its normative connotations, which served to reflect this relatively novel
structure as a competing consciousness and discourse. Contingency of the state
allows us to deconstruct it as a structure of domination and to better perceive the
underlying sources of tension between Islam on the one hand, and the modern state
and the ensuing international-global system, on the other. This helps expose the
violent hierarchy of opposites (e.g. territorial/non-territorial, progressive/regressive,
equality/inequality), in which the formers control the latter both axiologically and
logically (Derrida 1976: lxxvii).
Landscapes, of which the modern nation-states are constitutive structures, have
come to be seen as “texts” and discourses combining narratives, as well as
conceptual, ideological and signifying, representations (Barnes & Duncan 1992: 8).
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In this light the “state” constitutes an inter-textual artifact actualized to reflect a
particular self-image constructed and reconstructed through historical and political
processes. The contemporary meaning it has come to bear had been produced from
“text to text” rather than between “text and the real world.” The consequence is that
writing is constitutive, not simply reflective; new worlds are made
out of old texts, and old worlds are the basis of new texts. In this
world of one text careening off another, we cannot appeal to any
epistemological bedrocks in privileging one text over another. For
what is true is made inside texts, not outside them (Barnes &
Duncan 1992: 3).
Both Western theory and the “nation-state” are examples, of spatio-temporal
intertextuality, which has rendered the state, “like virtually all concepts in the field
of international relations…drenched with normative connotations” (Ferguson &
Mansbach 1989: 3). Being more or less the product of a common Western
civilizational matrix, one can refer to an intertextuality that is intratextual. R. B. J.
Walker was to the point when he indicated that theories of international relations
are aspects of contemporary world politics that need to be explained rather than
being an explanation. They are to be comprehended as a typical discourse of the
modern state and a “design” for constitutive practice that sought to limit and
delineate the horizons beyond which political action by “others” would be risky or
prohibited (Walker 1993: 6). Imperial and hegemonic constitutive designs required
the support of structures of power, which sustained their greatest impression by
availing from clearly articulated ideas. The outcome has been a conception of
“order”, which inherently benefited some at the expense of others (Paul & Hall
1999: 3). The modern state was the vital instrument of that order. Initial hopes that
the principle of state sovereignty would protect the weak through the
universalization of legal “equality,” have proven false as many states crumble and
collapse under the weight of the global system. This was the logical consequence of
a Western international order, which not only reflected leading states’ power and
material interests, but also their identities’ constitutive aspects (Ruggie 1988: 14).
In this sense Frantz Fanon had perceived notions of “respect of the sovereignty of
states” as a colonial “strategy of encirclement” (Fanon 1963: 71).
Whereas before 19th century European nationalism Muslims defined their “self”
first and foremost in religious terms, as Islam would normally have demanded of
them, the subsequently superimposed nation-state structure introduced competing
secular-Western instruments of identity formation. Islamic autonomy, conception
and self-referentiality were challenged at the normative level, and behaviorally at
the state and systemic levels. With the current wave of hegemonic neo-liberalism
this portends to reach down to social structures (e.g. family) and individual
attitudes. Very few of the Muslim failed pseudo-state structures are likely to be able
to meet this challenge, nor does the global system afford them a substantive change
of policy in response. The “state” in the abode of Islam remains a constituted object
not a constitutive subject, existing as a contingent by-product of outside formations
not as a necessary sign of inside principles. It has receded into a self-reinforcing
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condition of dependency, penetrated by external actors, and a reflection of
extratextuality. As such, it continues to strike at the very identity of this abode, the
most conspicuous manifestation of which has been the recognition by those states
of the region’s antithetical identity—Israel.
What applies to the Western world in a changing global system thus is different
from what applies to Muslim nations, in the same system. Unlike the former there is
no mutual global and state reconstitution, which would allow for intratextuality or
even for a measure of intertextuality. In many ways, the relationship between
globalization and the international system resembles that between post-modernity
and modernity. As far as the Muslim world is concerned, globalization seeks to
deconstruct their “state” structures, along non-territorial pre-colonial “preorganizational” lines, if possible, so as to re-inscribe them. In this sense,
globalization seeks neither to destroy nor to consolidate the state, but basically to
re-constuct it in a particular image. The question hence is not whether the “modern
state” as a sovereign entity is going to be undermined as such, but rather which
states will be dismantled, deconstructed, consolidated, nominalized, re-inscribed
and how. Like post-modernity, globalization may be post-international coming
after, yet representing a return to and questioning of earlier constructs (backward
looking) in order to reconstruct (forward looking). It is an act of restoration and a
forward looking dynamic simultaneously, still within the normal progression of
Western history. Despite all the uncertainties associated with globalization, it
remains simply the autonomous linear sequel of that history, reflected in the form of
continuation of an American hegemonic order (Ikenberry 1996: 89-91; Ikenberry
1999: 125).
The world this gives rise to will likely be based on intratextuality vs.
extratextuality, or what some observers have termed “a tale of two worlds”
(Goldgeier & McFaul 1992; Wildavsky 1993: 3). One world consists of a core or
“great power society” of nonunitary actors, focusing primarily on maximizing
wealth, sharing common liberal norms, and a horizontal relation of cooperative
interdependence. The other world, in which Muslim societies fall, consists of
periphery states, largely dependent on the core, and conducting their policies among
themselves according to the tenets of anarchy and structural realism (Goldgeier &
McFaul 1992: 468-470). Essentially that is, there will be two separate worlds with
horizontal cooperative and anarchic relations respectively, but which stand in a
vertical-hierarchical relationship vis-a-vis each other. One that is, of inequality.
“The state”, as Michael Walzer once observed, “is invisible; it must be
personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined
before it can be conceived” (Walzer 1967: 194). Deconstructing the modern state
structure in the abode of Islam requires developing a discourse and an ideological
thrust, which while undermining its force as it stands constructs a conceptual
alternative. This calls for the reconstitution of the state by changing its dimensions,
signification and content, and from thereon its meaning (Zartman 1995: 267); an
“essentially … normative” as well as a “scientific question” (Holsti 1985: 7). While
it is not uncommon in Western discourses to come across arguments supporting
such transformations the significance and implications for the two worlds remain
worlds apart. To the great power society it will mean more integration and unity á
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la the European Union or North American Free Trade agreement (NAFTA)
between Canada, Mexico and the US, or the consolidation of the power and
hegemonic influence of the Jewish state of Israel over its neighbors. Israel,
according to this discourse, would become the Trojan horse for a regional, imperial
neo-liberal power structure.
To the Muslim world in contra-distinction, the same Western discourse
regarding the state translates into “humanitarian intervention”, “minority rights”
and “right to secession (self-determination)” among other supposedly lofty yet
practically fragmentary principles. For, as Barry Buzan has indicated, “the idea of
the state, its institutions, and even its territory can all be threatened as much by the
manipulation of ideas as by the wielding of military power” (Buzan 1991: 97).
Whereas for the society of great powers the above values are mutually constitutive
and therefore inter and intra-textually sovereign, for the Muslim umma they
represent an authority over their Islamic values and their social and political
structures. The practical outcome of this extra-textual discourse is to re-constitute
notions of “sovereignty”, “recognized borders” and entitlement to “independence”,
allowing for a new and massive wave of colonial expansion to proceed unhindered
by formal legalistic encumbrances. The purpose is to serve global neo-liberal
interests as the supreme loci of power. This not only further de-legitimizes
Arab/Muslim pseudo-state structures but also de-constructs them for the purposes
of new inscriptions. Sovereignty of Islamic values are further undermined as a
stepping stone toward their total marginalization, depriving it in the process of any
possible domains of competing domestic or external functioning space. The
consequence as the Islamic landscape readily manifests, is social and political
fragmentation, identity crisis, splintering, diminution, conflict, and in the final
analysis, colonization.
As a prerequisite to expanding the horizons of an altered meaning of sovereignty
under global conditions, transformation in the “epistemic dimension” of social life,
or the system of meaning and signification embedded in collective mentalities, is
required. In order to allow for relational changes between the inside and the outside,
the extra-textual apparatus that ruling regimes in Muslim countries have come to
draw upon in imagining and symbolizing forms of political community will have to
undergo a fundamental re-orientation (Ruggie 1988: 184). So will their very
conception of problem solving. No longer is the state simply a means to power and
wealth from the inside shielded by sovereignty from the outside—which some may
call corruption—but a structure of “durable inequality” of which the former
predicament is but one source (Tilly 1999).
Self-referential standards of “civilization” set by a European model of statehood
and state organization, serving what were basically European interests and
reflecting their own moment of history, were all congenial to the structuring and
perpetuating of a world system of inequality (Kingsbury 1999: 74). Binary
oppositions associated with the state corresponded to “invisible” discursive
categorical differences locking groups in permanent structural relationships of
contrasts. Categories of inequality even when evidently employing cultural labels,
justifying for a particular group its own inferior position, relative or absolute, thus
rendering it natural, always depend on far-reaching, socio-political organization,
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belief and enforcement. In the field of international relations this translates into the
structural-global, the ideological-neo liberal, and the power-imperial respectively.
Durable inequality among categories develop because great powers which, control
access to “value-producing resources” solve defined systemic problems by means
of categorical distinctions based on constructed systems of closure, exclusion and
control (Tilly 1999: 7-8).
Policies, which sought to maintain colonial rule over “non-sovereign” territories,
came to increasingly depend on the structuring of categorical and binary
distinctions among ethnic and racial groups (e.g. civilized/uncivilized). Many of
those excluded and controlled, on the less privileged sides of the categorical divide,
eventually developed and acquired stakes in the formulated solutions, despite their
dominant hierarchies. Afro-American civil rights activist Malcolm X had this point
in mind when he struck the example of the slave in the field versus the slave in the
master’s house. Meeting in their free time, the latter would tell the former about the
joys of serving at “home”. In his speech he uses the first person plural—in our
house, our mansion or our palace, whatever the case may be, we do so and so.
Unlike the slave in the field who recognizes the reality of his status and resents it,
the one in the house is doubly enslaved: once because of the fact of being a slave
and twice by acquiring a stake in being a slave.
Categorical institutionalization of this kind serves to sustain relations of durable
inequality, as the master divides and conquers. Should the slave in the field rebel,
his counterpart at “home” can only have the limited option but to be his antagonist.
This condition is the inevitable outcome when debilitated Muslim states feel
obliged to sign on a human rights convention, a peace treaty or clauses of specific
gender “empowerment”, all supposedly bearing connotations of universal equality.
Not only do they submit to the bidding of a great power like the US in such
instances, but also in so doing they tie down their future options as they face greater
prospects of exacting compliance. Lacking significant influence on the principles of
international commitments they put their signature to, they become exposed to both
outside impositions and inside structural fragility. “Globalisation affects not just
their bargaining power at the time of negotiation, but more widely, their relative
power to make choices in the future” (Hurrell & Woods 1999: 456). As such, it is
inextricably intertwined with the propagation of inequality. Globalization, in other
words, negates in practice what universalization of values demands in theory. Thus
any “relationship between globalization and human rights”, for instance, becomes
“far from straightforward” (Clark 1999: 131). Or perhaps it is if the latter is nothing
more than an instrument of the former. As “particular” identities are being
developed with reference to the neo-liberal vision of the “universal”, and as
globalization is being universalized as a system of durable inequality, then it is clear
that human rights is nothing more than the ideological underpinnings of such a
global order.
Basically an old/new colonial project aimed at re-inscribing Muslim “state” and
society, by justifying intervention and enforcement. After all, as Andre Beteille has
insightfully observed, “Western societies were acquiring a new and comprehensive
commitment to equality at precisely that juncture in their history when they were
also developing in their fullest form the theory and practice of imperialism” (1983:
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4). Recently, W. Michael Reisman provided a consistent sample of this pattern.
Attempting to build a legal case for foreign intervention he argued that, national
sovereignty in its classical sense has become “anachronistic” and that it was
legitimate to intervene in countries deemed “undemocratic”. Human rights
constituted the basis for such intervention. State sovereignty was no longer to be a
protective shield if popular sovereignty is suppressed. Much in the same fashion
that the “wealth of a country can be spoliated as thoroughly by a native as by a
foreigner” so can popular sovereignty be “liberated as much by an indigenous as by
an outside force”. He added however, that its suppression constituted only “a
justifying factor” for intervention, “not a justification per se but conduit sine qua
non” (1990: 871-872). American global interests no doubt would be the
determining factor.
Like any political system, globalization requires mechanisms of control, which
in a global hierarchy function as sources of durable inequality. These include
exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation and adaptation. The first two fall at
the systemic level of analysis, and are largely responsible for the installation of the
categorical boundaries of inequality. The latter two, at the state and also the
individual-leadership levels, reinforce, consolidate and generalize the former
arrangements (Tilly 1999: 10).6 Exploitation occurs, when powerful actors in the
global system (insiders) command the resources and values from which they draw
increased returns. This takes place by coordinating the efforts of weaker actors
(outsiders) who are excluded from the full value added by that effort. Opportunity
hoarding provides stakes to the latter categories. It offers rewards or values, yet
monopolized, resources selectively to the segregated structures of the “sovereign”
state in order to undermine the force of revisionist tendencies, while keeping the
“unequal” divided. Emulation generalized the state system by copying or imposing
it not only as an established organizational model, but also by attempting to
transplant its concomitant yet alien social and political relations from one cultural
and historical milieu to another. It further served to lower the costs of maintaining
the status quo below any of the modern states’ potential or theoretical alternatives.
Adaptation articulated and elaborated regimes of systemic interaction among states
on the basis of presumably recognized, categorical inequality. The purpose was to
render the costs of moving to theoretically available alternatives prohibitively high.
Adaptation thus, locks categorical inequality by taking it for granted. Emulation
multiplies categorical inequality by producing “homologies” of form and function.
Together, they create the illusion of “ubiquity” and therefore “inevitability” of the
modern state, rather than its variability (Tilly 1999: 10 & 190-191).
Each of the above four mechanisms constituted “a self-reproducing element”
and together have all locked neatly into “a self-reproducing complex” (Tilly 1999:
191). Their impact can be clearly followed in the historical process of emulation
and adaptation, which had taken place in the Muslim Ottoman Empire during the
19th century (abolished in 1924) and subsequently by the fragmented Arab states
during the 20th century. The purpose of achieving parity and equality with the West
basically embodied these goals’ very antithesis. Yet, this process is still underway
as a “state” project increasingly being opposed by societal forces. Consequently and
in contrast to the European “nation-state”, the outcome has been a “state” contra the
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“nation”, to use Burhan Gholyun’s adept depiction (1994: 27-28). In the former
historical experience the state affirmed the nation, in the latter, it negated it.
Infusing this same structure with new ideas, sound or mistaken, while possibly
mitigating or exacerbating the effects of those mechanisms, will neither stymie nor
necessarily initiate them.
Democracy applied within the modern state—the structure, which has come to
embody those elements—will not contribute to rectifying this systemic
configuration of inequality. Allowed to function seriously, democracy is likely to
bring Islamist forces to power, which both religiously and ideologically, cannot
accept such a global order or state structure. This helps explain the absence of any
real systemic interest in having a functional democracy in the Muslim world, and
the intense American hostility to Islamic values. Nor by the same token, would the
mere implementation of the Shari’ah provide a ready solution as the “state” will
inevitably come to confront a hostile environment. Being constitutive of Islamic
identity, the Shari’ah means neither emulation nor adaptation. By extension this
challenges the control and distribution of resources and values undertaken by
exploitation and opportunity hoarding. Yet the holistic dimensions of the Shar’iah
cannot be fully expressed as the force of those mechanisms come into play. A
change in organizational forms—the installation of different categories, or the
transformation of relations between categories and rewards therefore, becomes
necessary (Tilly 1999: 15).
Defining those alternative organizational structures is part and parcel of any
possible autonomous and self-referential conceptual change. The crisis that the
Muslim world faces extends thus, beyond the issue of regimes’ legitimacy to that of
the legitimacy of the “state” structure itself. The Muslim “states” will have to relent
reciprocally on what is by now a fictional sovereignty—a seemingly paradoxical
dynamic of surrendering intra-sovereignty to gain in inter-sovereignty. Despite
inevitable systemic resistance this will have to proceed in such a fashion so as to
impose that “the ‘domestic’ is as much a part of the fabric of the international
system as any abstracted ‘structure’ of the relations between states” (Clark 1999: 5).
If a theory of state is largely a theory of its external environment, and if the
international-global order as it stands, is not what Islamic values and Arab and
Muslim people would readily accept, then it follows that to alter or significantly
influence that system, they will have to transform their extant state structures as
well. Much in the same fashion that a domestic change in the attributes of the
family, as the basic unit in society, would lead to transforming society and social
relations and vice versa (agent-structure), so would a change in the attributes of the
state, as the basic unit of the international-global system, alter the system and its
relations, and vice versa. With form and content in the Muslim world no longer
coinciding, either the state structure must be altered to fit the umma’s principled
beliefs, or the Islamic worldview must be diluted to suit the requirements of this
structure. Between an Islamic choice opting for the former, and global forces opting
for the latter, the modern Muslim “state” and its contradictions have reached an
historical impasse.
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Toward a Neo-Classical Islamic Framework

Much like globalization, Islamic theory merely induces a particular
conceptualization of the meaning of state. It does not necessarily negate statehood
as such even as it challenges its territoriality, but rather contests the association of
identity formation with bounded territory. The state in this new/old conception is a
means toward securing an Islamic or “good” life and not an end in itself. Islam, as
Ayatollah Muhammad Hussain Fadhlallah has put it, was not revealed in order to
establish a state as an end, but to spread a message based on which a state would
come into existence, only as a subsequent means toward achieving this goal (1996:
28). Whereas globalization is currently increasingly setting the state in service of
transnational flow of capital, goods and information, Islam sets it in the service of
religious values. The equality of Islamic universalism is about to confront the
inequality of primarily American globalization. A new binary dichotomy is taking
shape, not just between historically fixed categories, but more so among dynamic
flows of forces and values. The trajectory of the previously marginalized Islamic
law of nations seems to be catching up with the flow of current history.
Within the abode of Islam, the nature of external relationships between states
will have to be transformed. This means that Muslim states cannot continue to
maintain the structure of their relationships on the basis of supposedly unitary actors
engaged in an anarchic self-help power setting. They must move to an
“abodic”/macro level based on meta-power or assabiyya, as an endogenous/cooperative—exogenous /conflictive concept. Unlike mere Third Worldism which,
sought to guard security and independence by jealously defending the pseudo
“nation-state” structure, notwithstanding calls for transnational unity of one kind or
the other, assabiyya seeks to promote those very objectives among others, by
challenging the very imagery and conception of the modern state. Substantive issues
of this kind pose both theoretical and practical revisionist challenges to the status
quo, particularly so as issues of identity come to the forefront. The crucial and most
central issue hence is to determine where the assabiyya of Islam lies and to coalesce
around it, transcending territorial and vested or modern state interests. It is the
rational and reasoned tackling of primarily political and strategic questions of this
kind that will determine answers in the light of which categorical provisions of the
Shari’ah and determination of Islamic interests could be made.
Theorizing about the state, under such conditions, must itself begin by
subverting the framework of the great divide, whether between the inside and the
outside or between the abode of Islam and the abode of War. This does not mean
eliminating categorical distinctions, but rather recognizing that the stability of fixed
categories under conditions of fluidity and transformation is likely to experience,
powerful pressures (Clark 1999: 16 & 31). Fixed categories are inherently disposed
toward maintaining closures. Closure generally leads to entropy as loss of energy
and openness to entropy as loss of identity. The seeming opposition between both
forces frequently contributes to distress and uncertainty, particularly so as elements
of conservatism creep in, opting in response for the security of static norms to the
insecurity of dynamic interaction. This is problematic because systems of thought,
as well as geo-political structures, which seek to seal themselves off from outside
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forces, will tend to exhaust their ideas as well as their human and natural resources
respectively, and hence undergo high levels of entropy (Demko & Wood 1994: 28).
A branch-less tree may continue to grow for sometime until it reaches certain limits,
which it cannot go beyond. Only the branches however, can allow it to “pro-create”
and in a sense reproduce itself. Manifesting closure, recurrence and repetition, the
Islamic law of nations collapsed theory into law, the branch into the stem and the
part into the whole. Its potential evolutionary and contributive energy was thus
exhausted.
Shifts in the systemic order and capabilities are strongly intertwined with
qualitative and quantitative factors ranging from conceptual change, political,
economic or social structural organization, to an increase in space, resources or
external more favorable conditions. Non-territoriality, as one such organizing
principle, is linked to relative and absolute power changes in the
international/global system, not simply as a matter of stretch or expanse, but also in
terms of the concomitant changes necessary for the effective management of space.
To talk about non-territoriality thus is to incorporate qualitative as well as
quantitative transformations both at the state and “abodic”/macro levels. If
successfully constitutive of a new geopolitical and strategic reality, the impact
could eventually translate into a broader measure of global influence or better
internal control over the external environment, hence a relative reduction in
conditions of inequality.
Two “postulates” may help in justifying the principle of non-territoriality, and
perhaps in developing the argument further in harmony with rational Islamic
theoretical underpinnings and religious principles. First, that “a state’s relative
capability in a system will increase when its rate of absolute growth is greater than
the absolute growth rate for that system as a whole (the systemic norm)”. Second,
that “a state’s relative capability growth will accelerate for a time and then (at a
point of inflection) begin a process of deceleration” (Doran 1991: 4; italics in
original text). Both assumptions transcend the divide between the inside and outside
in that intra-Muslim state borders and sovereignty lose much of their significance
while at the same time new reorganizing principles of state are introduced. Reforms
which may cause positive increase in a state’s capabilities are likely to be
constrained and limited by territoriality and thus will reach their limits long before
being able to attain an essential actor role.
Conversely, in the hypothetical situation where two or more Muslim states
happen to unite without internally reorganizing, the same sources of failure will
simply be transposed from what was previously a smaller structural failure to a
larger one. Should both reform and unification occur simultaneously, then a
situation might emerge in which the absolute growth of the “Islamic State” could be
greater than that of the system. This is one important reason why the US is hostile
to Islamic geopolitical conceptions and values, which seek to change the
connotations of the state. These considerations have much less to do with Islamic
“radicalism” or “moderation” as such and more with systemic idiosyncrasies. This
is illustrated by American policy toward the experiences of the two countries of
Iraq and Egypt. When the US mobilized to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
1991, it was, among other reasons, to protect the ultimate structure of “sovereign”
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states, and the mechanisms serving that purpose—the Arab bordered “state”.
Breaking the borders “taboo”, irrespective of intentions, would have allowed for
a change in conception regarding the ubiquity and inevitability of the state
structure, and an increase in the relative autonomy and power of an emerging
regional power. This was not only in the case of Iraq. When Egypt attacked Libya
in 1977, with the prospect of taking over the oil fields of that country the US made
its disapproval amply clear. Despite American hostility to Muammar Qadhaffi’s
regime and its friendly relations with the Egyptian counterpart, a warning was
conveyed to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat indicating opposition to such a
takeover. The US would not countenance an increase in Egypt’s capabilities at an
accelerated rate once it had laid its hands on Libya’s oil (Heikal 1996: 228 & 247).
This may have been explained by reason of international law had the US not
previously supported Iraq’s invasion of Iran, and had not American international
behavior in other cases been similarly aggressive. In addition, it remains highly
unlikely, that the US would at any point of time look favorably, say, to a possible
union between Egypt, Libya and Sudan, even if it was consummated peacefully.
The reasons have much to do with the idea of global order and the bordered state
system “switching-off” that of a unified Arab and/or Muslim nation as well as with
considerations of absolute and relative power.
Robert Gilpin has observed that, “a more wealthy and more powerful state (up to
the point of diminishing utility) [can] select a larger bundle of security and welfare
goals than a less wealthy and powerful state” (Gilpin 1981: 22 & 23). Whereas the
consolidation and mobilization of a collective Islamic-Arab identity in response to
globalization would have been required, systemic interests have sought instead to
impose the state secular identity as the highest value. As a result primary and/or
secondary identities are imposed not chosen. Supporting a tribal emir in Kuwait,
perpetually in a state of fear of an “inside” neighbor and in need of permanent
“outside” protection to stay in power, constitutes a self-reproducing mechanism of
regional control and durable inequality. Even by the standards of primacy of state
values, the Muslim “state” has been a failure. Yet, Muslim states continue to pursue
contradictory and conflicting state policies ultimately leading to a progressive
dynamic of fragmentation, bringing them under total systemic colonization and
domination. The tragedy of the Muslim community/umma if one may paraphrase
Jean Jacque Rousseau, is that it is in all Muslims’ religious and values interests to
unite under a commonly agreed upon sovereign/Imam in order to have a better
chance at attaining a larger security bundle. Yet it is in the interest of each single
regime or state to obviate that authority when it is to its own expediency (Williams
et. al 1993: 100).
Calls for Muslim states to develop policies of cooperation and mutual assistance
in different forums and at different levels (Sulayman 1993: xiv) while continuing to
maintain their structures of durable inequality, are unrealistic and naïve to say the
least. First, global imperatives may render such cooperation untenable, and may
compel its norms in such a fashion that each Muslim, state considerations, may find
it more rewarding and in its interest, not to cooperate—most such states being
highly penetrated and dependent, if not outright colonized. Secondly, as Geoffrey
Garret and Barry Weingast have put it, “to assert that institutions help assure
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adherence to the rules of the game is to overlook a prior and critical issue. If the
members of a community cannot agree to one set of rules, the fact that institutions
might facilitate adherence to them would be irrelevant” (quoted in Goldstein &
Keohane 1993: 18).
Mere cooperation therefore, is no substitute for unity, both functional and
political. As a matter of fact, in a world of realism the former is highly unlikely
without the latter. Only the ability of a centralized (federal or otherwise) authority
to extract the collective resources of the umma would allow the state to exert more
control over its external environment. The resources at the disposal of the Muslim
world cannot be mobilized or extracted through goodwill, moral exhortations, or
sympathy. Notwithstanding the necessity of the former bona fide factors, they must
be translated into centralized and structured imperatives. Fareed Zakaria made an
insightful point when he distinguished, in his politico-historical study of the US,
between state and national power. Only when the “state” could establish centralized
control over the extraordinary resources of the American “nation” by 1890, was it
possible for the US to pursue a coherent foreign policy that would serve that
country’s purpose of exerting control over its external environment well into the
20th century and beyond.
Until such a hold could be established and despite its tremendous resources, the
US remained a “weak divided and decentralized” state, providing policymakers
with “little usable power” (Zakaria 1998: 55). The same could be said about the
European Union (EU). Despite the abundance of resources at that Union’s disposal,
which match if not exceed that of the US, the EU remains limited in the amount of
control it can exert on the external environment, whether in terms of foreign or
military policy. No effective sovereign and/or centralized extractive institutions as
of yet exist which could translate wealth into power. Both the US and EU federative
experiences thus, provide for comparative empirical evidence in the light of which
Islamic unifying religio-political concepts such as the Imamite and the Caliphate
could be reformulated and operationalized geo-politically. The modified restoration
of the Caliphate as an institution, contrary to claims projecting this as a return to the
past and unrealistic, constitutes the Islamic, though perhaps yet unarticulated
equivalent, to the secular European Union project and even to that of the US
“federation”. Yet, it is dubbed regressive even as it transcends the modern “state”,
and is hence visionary and futuristic.
Other relevant historical cases must also be examined and analyzed, such as
those of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Soviet Empire, and most significantly,
the Ottoman empire. Their rise and decline, in the framework of assabiyya, among
potentially other concepts, could provide for a fresh historical and Islamic
outlook—assabiyya in this context referring to the right and eligibility of a
particular group to rule or otherwise, thus strongly intertwined with legitimacy. A
comparative analysis between rational regimes and regimes of Law (Shari’ah) as
related to those empires could lead to insightful conclusions. So would examining
the possible links between assabiyya as theory of state, and corresponding increased
control over the external environment as a systemic reflection—both being two
aspects of a single dynamic breaking the inside/outside divide.
Severing this divide requires the cognitive opening of the closed categories of
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the Islamic classical theory. This means being able to discriminate between closed
normative aspects (Law—stem) and the theoretical and practical underpinnings
(theory and praxis—branch). Khadduri made an important point in this respect
when he distinguished between jihad as a doctrine of permanent state of war and
the condition of actual and continuous fighting (Khadduri 1955: 64). A distinction
of the kind is useful in elaborating and transcending the boundaries of fixed
categories. The fact that the latter were considered stemic normative wholes or
universals, led to the diffused incorporation of the partial (branch) and contingent
condition of actual fighting, into the abode of War category. This implied that no
distinction was made between the abode of War as a closed and necessary category
on the one hand, and the open and contingent issues of peace and war on the other.
One basically was inherently implied in the other. Thus, under circumstances in
which fighting was neither feasible nor perhaps required doubts as a consequence,
were cast on the normative category. A case in which the theoretical “system”
turned against itself rather than opting to evolve while maintaining its own
integrity.
A neo-classical Islamic framework is needed therefore to provide for new
conceptions of relationships between norms and values on the one hand, and
interests and interaction on the other. A relational distinction must be introduced
between the macro-abstract worldviews and principled beliefs, and those of micro
causalities. This is in contrast to the classical framework, which diffused both. In an
Islamic frame of reference, normative principles as well as cognitive interests bear
an originative influence in determining action. As such, a neo-classical framework’s
starting point is to reformulate the cognitive problem in terms of how to bring forth
the distinctiveness of the evolutionary branch in a dynamic unity such that closure
and openness reflect “reciprocal conditions” rather than “contradictions”, thus
recharging energy and consolidating identity.
In this unity openness of the Islamic value system bases itself upon selfreferential closure, and closed reproduction refers to the environment (Luhmann
1990: 230). This is a different way of referring to subversion of categorical
inside/outside distinctions in favor of mutual adaptation of a specific kind.
Synthesizing Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical theory of state (assabiyya) and historical
dynamics, with the Islamic law of nations caters to a promising ontologicalepistemological Islamic framework, combining theory of state with international
theory, forming what may be called a power cycle theory. One that “encompasses
both the state and the system in a single dynamic” and which reflects structural
change, at the two levels concurrently. It unites the structural and behavioral aspects
of state international political development in a single dynamic and can be analyzed
on each level by means of a variety of approaches. These may include religious
interpretations, history, understanding of international and global political behavior,
or empirical testing (Doran 1996: 19-20; italics in original text).
However, that the concept of “statehood” is also being concomitantly
transformed elevates such a power cycle theory to the meta-level. In this context,
introducing the leadership principle of Wilayat al-Faqih as a potential model and an
empirical expression of assabiyya could help in building a commensurate theory of
state.7 The dynamism of this Islamic grounded causal belief and its institutionalized
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practical and empirical manifestations, justify it as an operational Islamic
conceptual construct.8 Thus at this point, we could perhaps imagine three concentric
circles including Wilayat al-Faqih (innermost), assabiyya (middle) and abode of
Islam (outermost) (Fig. 2, below). The first indicates who is to rule (causal beliefs—
fatawa), the second explains why (principled beliefs—fiqh), and the third delineates
the non-territorial domain or “state”—where (worldview—Shari’ah). A neoclassical Islamic theory which introduces these elements of complexity into its
structure, could help explain potential influence on global and international
relations caused by the cyclical dynamic of state ascendancy and/or decline.
Fig. 2
dar al-Islam
dar al-harb

conflict/war
assabiyya

Wilayat al-Faqih
Fig. 2 introduces an element of complexity and depicts the suggested neo-Classical
“state” approach.
At the same time, the closed normative categories of abode of Islam vs. abode of
War would carry the different yet symmetrical connotations of identity and self
rather than of permanent conflict and hostility. Branching out of them are the
cognitive asymmetrical aspects of a) peace (dar al-Ahd), b) tension (dar al-Sulh) or
c) actual war or aggression (dar al-Baghy) (Fig 3).9
Fig. 3
Peace
dar al-harb

dar al-Islam

Tension
Fig. 2
War

assabiyya

Wilayat al-Faqih
Fig. 3 represents the “branching-out” or the cognitive opening of the
normatively closed categories reflecting the different states of peace, tension,
or war. Peace = dar al-silm, Tension = dar al-sulh, War = dar al-baghy.
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This allows for a measure of flexibility, fluidity and inferences, hence dynamism, as
opposed to the static framework of fixed and immutable categories. The “West”,
rather than being perceived solely in terms of the classical category (abode of war
and conflict) may instead, remain as the abode of War (the other or separate
identity), with mutual relations varying based on political contingencies. The latter
reading reflects the “security of social relationship, a sense of being safely in
cognitive control of the interaction context. It is relational at the most basic level of
interaction: that of the mutual knowledge which is a condition of action, and which
derives from a sense of shared community”. Essentially it becomes a source of
“ontological security”, which “relates to the self, its social competence, [and] its
confidence in the actor’s capacity to manage relations with others” (McSweeney
1999: 157), a condition of closure that is, being the prerequisite for openness.
Corresponding to the above cognitive aspects of peace, tension, or
conflict/fighting, the “West” may be perceived along the fluid policies of a) nonimperial powers, b) semi-imperial powers and c) imperial powers respectively (Fig.
4).
Fig. 4

dar al-harb

Nonimperial
Semiimperial
Imperial

dar al-Islam

assabiyya

Wilayat al-Faqih

Fig. 4 suggests a policy framework which, while normatively closed is
cognitively open. It is based on policies rather than generalized closed
categories but which, also protects identity structure. The non-imperial, semiimperial, imperial identifications correspond to the respective conditions of
peace, tension and war in Fig. 3.
Conflict would hence shift from a fixed “Western” category toward a fluid imperial
counterpart, as actors’ roles may change or alter over time. Reformulated
accordingly, the “abode of War” against which, jihad or just war may in principle
be conducted, becomes imperialism and not the West as such, policies not
categories. In this sense jihad re-appropriates its just and defensive connotations.
Fluidity by the same token requires the expansion of cognitive skills (fatawa) into
fields of strategic planning, prioritization and political analysis as categories,
change, mix or transform. It demands further the sharpening of dynamic theoretical
inferences, while remaining at the same time cognizant of normative closures and
red lines related to religious values and interests. It is perhaps this framework,
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which has allowed the Iranian Islamic experience to evolve successfully, despite
great systemic opposition, from revolution to a revolutionary state, to an
institutionalized state, while remaining loyal to Islamic principles both domestically
and externally. Its normative closure was the very condition of its evolution and
cognitive opening. This is in contradistinction to the Arab, normatively open and
cognitively closed, “state”. No wonder the former is dynamic and evolving, the
latter static, fragmenting and decaying.
These considerations argue for the continued yet modified relevance of the
Islamic classical approach to relations among nations. The respect with which it has
been held, by Muslims through the centuries is therefore not necessarily misplaced.
Where it is perhaps out of place, is in veneration, which does not allow for
intellectual expansion, elaboration and complexity, combined with a state of
paralysis and immobility emanating from a feeling of insecurity about being unable
to preserve religious identity in a perceived “hostile” global environment. Fear, that
is, fuelled by the implications of being an adaptive object rather than a constitutive
subject. Islamic beliefs and ideas, for a myriad of historical reasons, have been
largely detached from national and global structures and processes. As such they
were unable to play an active role in shaping national and government policies or
reach out beyond to influence systemic configurations. To the extent that beliefs
determine and sway policy and thus, are potentially constitutive of the domestic and
possibly the external environment could such fears be mitigated. This requires
moving beyond the simplicity of normative closures toward a dynamic relationship
with the complexities of cognitive openness. A neo-classical framework heralds the
end of simplicity in much the same fashion that the end of the bipolar structured
Cold War World has ushered in.

Notes
1. It is true that the Hanafi school of thought recognized the territorial implications
affecting religious rulings, as opposed to a pure non-territorial personal obligation to
follow them. However, this hinged on a non-Islamic territorial law not contradicting
any Islamic injunction (e.g. eating pork or drinking wine). The latter always had
precedence even though a Muslim in non-Muslim territory was expected to obey
local rules and laws.
2. Al-Shyabani was termed by Joseph Hammer von Purgstall as the Hugo Grotious
of the Muslims (Khadduri 1966: 56). His works were described by Weeramantary as
“the world’s earliest treatise on international law as a separate topic”
(Weeramantary 1988: 130). As a matter of fact, Weeramantary argues persuasively
that it was the influence of Islamic international law that served as the triggering
factor in the development of the Western counterpart. Western scholars in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were well aware of Arab/Islamic literature and
sciences through Spain and Italy. Weeramantary also provides a host of
circumstantial evidence indicating that Grotious was influenced by Islamic
scholarship even though he never acknowledged it (Weeramantary 1988: 149-158).
Appreciative references to the Qur’an and to the Islamic law, pertinent to
international relations, could also be found in the writings of Montesquieu
(Weeramantary 1988: pp. 108-109).
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3. There is a rather a negative religious connotation associated with the concept of
assabiyya as a reflection of chauvinism and/or nepotism; characteristics which the
Prophet Muhammad is reported to have condemned. Ibn Khaldun’s usage of the
term however, refers not to this negative aspect but to the more general sentiments
of solidarity, which bring people together in order to create society, the foundation
of any eventual good. Assabiyya in this sense refers not only to those primordial
feelings, which are embedded in the natural ties of kinship and blood relations, but
also to the broader context of group cohesion, affiliation and common concerns—an
esprit de corps of sorts. It embodies both the natural and functional purposes of
human social and political existence organized around those who lead and those
who are led. This paper however will attempt to expand and reconstruct this concept
beyond its conventional and narrow Khaldunian meaning in order to apply it to
contemporary structures and contingencies.
4. Ghunaimi has indicated that “…it is not accurate to include the doctrines of the
various Islamic schools of thoughts [paradigms] in the Shari’ah stricto sensu. These
schools, in fact represent different processes of speculation on what the divine law,
the Shari’ah might be” (1969:133).
5. An epistemic community, consists of knowledge-based experts who share both
cause-effect conceptions and sets of normative and principled beliefs (Goldstein &
Keohane 1993: 11). This does not mean that members of such a community have to
agree on every detail. Ijma’ by the same token does not necessarily mean the
absence of differences, but rather their existence yet within a common Islamic
normative structure. In this sense, differences between for instance, Hanafis and
Shafi’is, regarding details of conducting relations with non-Muslim nations need not
be understood or translated into discontinuity or an absence of ijma’ at least as far as
the Islamic theory in concerned. Michel Foucault for instance indicated that despite
all the apparent challenge’s that Marx’s ideas presented to the power and
domination of ruling classes and their ideologies, “at the deepest level of Western
knowledge, Marxism introduced no real discontinuity”. And while the erupting
conflict and opposition to his ideas “may have stirred up a few waves and caused a
few surface ripples…they [were] no more than storms in a children’s paddling pool”
(Foucault 1970: 261-262). In the Islamic religious field, it may be possible to make
an analogy with the sunni-shi’ite divide.
6. In what follows in this section I draw on the work by Tilly. However, unlike his
organizational and intra-state focus I expand his work to the international and global
context.
7. The real significance of the Islamic revolution and its structures of authority as an
empirical model, have been frequently overlooked by Sunnis. By ignoring that
experience as well as Shi’ite jurisprudence, a wealth of knowledge of immense
potential benefit to the debilitated state of Sunni fiqh and political theoretical
development is simply excluded. Yet having been a historical minority, Shi’ite
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jurisprudence provides for fiqh al-aqalliyya (minority). Having been persecuted and
weak, it provides for fiqh al-istidh’af (the weak/downtrodden). Having never closed
the gate of ijtihad, it provides for fiqh al-ijtihad (innovation)—a talent which,
Sunnis have apparently lost in favor of taqlid (emulation), whether of their
predecessors or of the West. Having represented opposition to the Sunni ruling
establishment, it provides for fiqh al-thawra/al-khuruj (revolution), particularly in
light of the Iranian Islamic revolutionary experience. Having been able, not only to
establish an Islamic state, but also to institutionalize it under the aegis of Wilayat alFaqih principle, it provides for fiqh al-dawla (state). Finally, having been able to
deal dynamically with, and to exert increased influence on the external environment
while credibly holding fast to Islamic principles, it provides for fiqh al’ilaqat alkharijjiyya (external relations). All these six aspects of jurisprudence provide for a
comprehensive theoretical and empirical corpus of knowledge, which rationally
justifies the principle of al-Wilayat. In a re-constructive effort of this kind, SunniShi’i relations must be seen through a strategic rather than historical perspective.
8. The Islamic theory of nations and Ibn Khaldun together with the empirical
experience of the Iranian Islamic revolution provide ample opportunity for
broadening Muslims’ intellectual/ijtihad horizons of research. The “Islamic”
justification for the choice of Wilayat al-Faqih here as the most relevant leadership
principle is based on the Prophetic Tradition narrated by Abu-Huraira, the
companion of the Prophet. When the Qur’anic verse “...if ye turn back (from the
path), He will substitute in your stead another people [non-Arab?]; then they would
not be like you”, was revealed (ch. 47:39) the Prophet was asked, who those
substituting people may be. He put his hand on Salman’s (the only Persian Muslim
at the time) shoulder and said “this man and his people. By him in whose hands my
soul is, if the faith were to be as far as ‘al-Thurayya’ [secular epoch?] it shall be
brought back by men from among the Persians [The Islamic Revolution?]”. AlThurayya is a name of a star (Al-Tabari 1980: v. 26, 42); (al- Qurtobi, 1967: v. 16,
258). This does not preclude further rational justifications based on the theory and
practice of the Iranian leadership. The concept will be used in this article in a more
or less reified unproblematic form. On Iran, government and theory of state
detailing Wilayat al-Faqih as an Islamic leadership principle, and as a praxis of
Islamic assabiyya see (Sabet 1994, 583-605).
9. Dar al-Ahd or the abode of the covenant is used here to refer to peaceful relations
of a more or less enduring kind (non-imperialists). Dar al-Sulh or the abode of
peaceful arrangements, connotes temporality and contingency determined by less
enduring more tense relations (semi-imperialists). Dar al-Baghy or the abode of
aggression, refers to imperialist and hostile actors.
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POLICY FORUM:
In Response to September 11

SEPTEMBER 11: CHOICES AND PROSPECTS
Noam Chomsky
*Editorial Note: The following is an edited version of an interview of Noam
Chomsky by radio B92, Belgrade on September 18, 2001. Each section is in
response to specific questions, which were posed by the interviewer who selected
the topics to be discussed.
Origins
In examining the attacks on the U.S. on September 11, we must first identity the
perpetrators of the crimes. It is generally assumed, plausibly, that their origin is the
Middle East region, and that the attacks probably trace back to the Osama Bin
Laden network, a widespread and complex organization, doubtless inspired by Bin
Laden but not necessarily acting under his control. Let us assume that this is true. A
sensible person would try to ascertain Bin Laden’s views, and the sentiments of the
large reservoir of supporters of much of what he says throughout the region. About
all of this, we have a great deal of information.
Bin Laden has been interviewed extensively over the years by highly reliable
Middle East specialists, notably the most eminent correspondent in the region,
Robert Fisk, reporting for the London Independent, who has intimate knowledge of
the entire region and direct experience over decades. A Saudi Arabian millionaire,
Bin Laden became a militant Islamic leader in the war to drive the Russians out of
Afghanistan. He was one of the many religious fundamentalist extremists recruited,
armed and financed by the CIA and their allies in Pakistani intelligence, and
elsewhere, to cause maximal harm to the Russians—quite possibly delaying their
withdrawal, some analysts suspect—though whether he personally happened to
have direct contact with the CIA is unclear, and not particularly important.
Not surprisingly, the CIA preferred the most fanatic and cruel fighters they could
mobilize. According to Simon Jenkins, a regional expert for the London Times, the
end result was to “destroy a moderate regime and create a fanatical one, from
groups recklessly financed by the Americans”. These “Afghanis” as they are called
(many, like Bin Laden, not from Afghanistan) carried out terror operations across
the border in Russia, but they terminated these after Russia withdrew. Their war
was not against Russia, which they despise, but against the Russian occupation and
Russia’s crimes against Muslims.
The “Afghanis” did not terminate their activities, however. They joined Bosnian
Muslim forces in the Balkan Wars; the U.S. did not object, just as it tolerated
Iranian support for them, for complex reasons that we need not pursue here, apart
from noting that concern for the grim fate of the Bosnians was not prominent among
them. The “Afghanis” are also fighting the Russians in Chechnya, and, quite
possibly, are involved in carrying out terrorist attacks in Moscow and elsewhere in
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places where, as they see it, Muslims are under attack. Bin Laden and his
“Afghanis” turned against the U.S. in 1990 when they established permanent bases
in Saudi Arabia—from his point of view, a counterpart to the Russian occupation of
Afghanistan, but far more significant because of Saudi Arabia’s special status as the
guardian of the holiest shrines.
Bin Laden is also bitterly opposed to the corrupt and repressive regimes of the
region, which he regards as “un-Islamic”, including the Saudi Arabian regime, the
most extreme Islamic fundamentalist regime in the world, apart from the Taliban,
and a close U.S. ally since its origin. Bin Laden despises the U.S. for its support of
these regimes. Like others in the region, he is also outraged by long-standing U.S.
support for Israel’s brutal military occupation, now in its 35th year: Washington’s
decisive diplomatic, military and economic intervention in support of the killings,
the harsh and destructive siege over many years, the daily humiliation to which
Palestinians are subjected, the expanding settlements designed to break the occupied
territories into Bantustan-like cantons and take control of the resources, the gross
violation of the Geneva Conventions, and other actions that are recognized as
crimes throughout most of the world, apart from the U.S. which has prime
responsibility for them.
And like others, he contrasts Washington’s dedicated support for these crimes
with the decade-long U.S.-British assault against the civilian population of Iraq,
which has devastated the society and caused hundreds of thousands of deaths while
strengthening Saddam Hussein—who was a favored friend and ally of the U.S. and
Britain right through his worst atrocities, including the gassing of the Kurds, as
people of the region also remember well, even if Westerners prefer to forget the
facts.
These sentiments are very widely shared. The Wall Street Journal (September
14, 2001) published a survey of opinions of wealthy and privileged Muslims in the
Gulf region (bankers, professionals and businessmen with close links to the U.S.).
They expressed much the same views: resentment of the U.S. policies of supporting
Israeli crimes and blocking the international consensus on a diplomatic settlement
for many years while devastating Iraqi civilian society, supporting harsh and
repressive anti-democratic regimes throughout the region, and imposing barriers
against economic development by “propping up oppressive regimes”. Among the
great majority of people suffering deep poverty and oppression, similar sentiments
are far more bitter, and are the sources of the fury and despair that is part of the
background for such atrocities as suicide bombings, as commonly understood by
those who are interested in the facts.
The U.S. and much of the West prefer a more comforting story. To quote the
lead analysis in the New York Times (September 16, 2001), the perpetrators acted
out of “hatred for the values cherished in the West as freedom, tolerance, prosperity,
religious pluralism and universal suffrage”. U.S. actions are irrelevant, and therefore
need not even be mentioned (Serge Schmemann). This is a convenient picture, and
the general stance is not unfamiliar in intellectual history; in fact, it is close to the
norm. It happens to be completely at variance with everything we know, but has all
the merits of self-adulation and uncritical support for power.
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It is also widely recognized that Bin Laden and others like him are praying for “a
great assault on Muslim states”, which cause “fanatics to flock to his cause”
(Jenkins, and many others). That too is familiar. The escalating cycle of violence is
typically welcomed by the harshest and most brutal elements on both sides, a fact
evident enough from the recent history of the Balkans, to cite only one of many
cases.
American Inner Policy and Self Perception
As U.S. policy has been officially announced, the world is being offered a “stark
choice”: join us or “face the certain prospect of death and destruction” (R.W. Apple,
New York Times, September 14, 2001). Congress has authorized the use of force
against any individuals or countries the President determines to be involved in the
attacks, a doctrine that every supporter of the measure regards as ultra-criminal.
That is easily demonstrated. Simply ask how the same people would have reacted if
Nicaragua had adopted this doctrine after the U.S. had rejected the orders of the
World Court to terminate its “unlawful use of force” against Nicaragua and had
vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on all states to observe international
law. And that terrorist attack was far more severe and destructive even than this
atrocity.
As for how these matters are perceived here, that is far more complex. One
should bear in mind that the media and the intellectual elites generally have their
particular agendas. Furthermore, the answer to this question is, in significant
measure, a matter of decision: as in many other cases, with sufficient dedication and
energy, efforts to stimulate fanaticism, blind hatred and submission to authority can
be reversed. We all know that very well.
American Policy Abroad
The initial response was to call for intensifying the policies that led to the fury
and resentment that provides the background from which terrorist attacks arise and
sometimes gain sympathy, and to pursue more intensively the agenda of the most
hard line elements of the leadership: increased militarization, domestic
regimentation, and attack on social programs. That is all to be expected. Again,
terror attacks and the escalating cycle of violence they often engender tend to
reinforce the authority and prestige of the most harsh and repressive elements of a
society. But there is nothing inevitable about submission to this course.
Prospect: Fear
Every sane person should be afraid of the likely reaction—the one that has
already been announced, the one that probably answers Bin Laden’s prayers. It is
highly likely to escalate the cycle of violence, in the familiar way, but in this case
on a far greater scale. The U.S. has already demanded that Pakistan terminate the
food and other supplies that are keeping at least some of the starving and suffering
people of Afghanistan alive. [To quote the exact words on September 16, 2001, the

56

September 11

New York Times reported that “Washington has also demanded [from Pakistan] a
cutoff of fuel supplies…and the elimination of truck convoys that provide much of
the food and other supplies to Afghanistan’s civilian population”.]
If that demand is implemented, unknown numbers of people who have not the
remotest connection to terrorism will die, possibly millions. Let me repeat: the U.S.
has demanded that Pakistan kill possibly millions of people who are themselves
victims of the Taliban. This has nothing to do even with revenge. It is at a far lower
moral level even than that. The significance is heightened by the fact that this is
mentioned in passing, with no comment, and probably will hardly be noticed. We
can learn a great deal about the moral level of the reigning intellectual culture of the
West by observing the reaction to this demand. I think we can be reasonably
confident that if the American population had the slightest idea of what is being
done in their name, they would be utterly appalled. It would be instructive to seek
historical precedents.
If Pakistan does not agree to this and other U.S. demands, it may come under
direct attack as well—with unknown consequences. If Pakistan does submit to U.S.
demands, it is not impossible that the government will be overthrown by forces
much like the Taliban—who in this case will have nuclear weapons. That could
have an effect throughout the region, including the oil producing states. At this
point we are considering the possibility of a war that may destroy much of human
society.
Even without pursuing such possibilities, the likelihood is that a massive attack
on Afghans will have pretty much the effect that most analysts expect: it will enlist
great numbers of others to support of Bin Laden, as he hopes. Even if he is killed, it
will make little difference. His voice will be heard on cassettes that are distributed
throughout the Islamic world, and he is likely to be revered as a martyr, inspiring
others. It is worth bearing in mind that one suicide bombing—a truck driven into an
U.S. military base—drove the world’s major military force out Lebanon 20 years
ago. The opportunities for such attacks are endless. And suicide attacks are very
hard to prevent.
Reflection: Will the World Be the Same?
The horrendous terrorist attacks on Tuesday are something quite new in world
affairs, not in their scale and character, but in the target. For the U.S., this is the first
time since the War of 1812 that its national territory has been under attack, even
under threat. Its colonies have been attacked, but not the national territory itself.
During these years the U.S. virtually exterminated the indigenous population,
conquered half of Mexico, intervened violently in the surrounding region,
conquered Hawaii and the Philippines (killing hundreds of thousands of Filipinos),
and in the past half century particularly, extended its resort to force throughout
much of the world. The number of victims is colossal. For the first time, the guns
have been directed the other way. The same is true, even more dramatically, of
Europe. Europe has suffered murderous destruction, but from internal wars,
meanwhile conquering much of the world with extreme brutality. It has not been
under attack by its victims outside, with rare exceptions (the IRA in England, for
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example). It is therefore natural that NATO should rally to the support of the U.S.;
hundreds of years of imperial violence have an enormous impact on the intellectual
and moral culture.
It is correct to say that this is a novel event in world history, not because of the
scale of the atrocity, regrettably, but because of the target. How the West chooses to
react is a matter of supreme importance. If the rich and powerful choose to keep to
their traditions of hundreds of years and resort to extreme violence, they will
contribute to the escalation of a cycle of violence, in a familiar dynamic, with longterm consequences that could be awesome. Of course, that is by no means
inevitable. An aroused public within the more free and democratic societies can
direct policies towards a much more humane and honorable course.

THE UNITED STATES, THE WEST AND
THE REST OF THE WORLD
Johan Galtung
Diagnosis
The world will never be the same again after the terrible attack on the economic
U.S., the military U.S., the foreign policy U.S., and on human beings like all of us.
We embrace the victims of the violence, of all violence, in deep grief, and express
our hope that perpetrators will be brought to justice. Violence at this level can only
be explained by a very high level of dehumanisation of the victims in the minds of
the aggressors, often due to a very deep level of unresolved, basic conflict. The
word “terrorism” may describe the tactics, but like “state terrorism” only portrays
the perpetrator as evil, satanic, and does not go to the roots of the conflict.
The text of the targets reads like a retaliation for U.S. use of economic power
against poor countries and poor people, U.S. use of military power against
defenseless people, and U.S. political power against the powerless. This calls to
mind the many countries around the world where the U.S. has bombed or otherwise
exercised its awesome power, directly or indirectly; adding 100,00 dying daily at
the bottom of an economic system by many identified with U.S. economic, military
and political power. Given the millions, not thousands, of victims it has to be
expected that this will generate a desire for retaliation somewhere, some time.
The basic dividing line in this conflict is class, of countries and of people. It is
not civilisation, although the U.S. sense of mission, manifest destiny, and Islamic
sense of righteousness are parts of it. Right now the confrontation seems to be
between the U.S./West and Arabs/Muslims. But this may also be a fallacy of
misplaced concreteness: the latter may possess more intention and more capability
than other victims of the enormous U.S./West violence since the Second World
War. We should neither underestimate the extent of solidarity in the “rest of the
world”, nor the solidarity of the world upper class, the West, and build solidarity
with victims everywhere.
In placing the horrendous attack on the U.S. in the context of a cycle of
retaliation there is no element of justification, no excuse, no guilt-attribution. There
is only deep regret that this chain of violence and retaliation is a human fact. But it
may also serve to make us break that vicious spiral.
Prognosis
With talk of Crusades from the U.S., and of the fourth stage of jihad, Holy War,
from Islamic quarters, the world may be heading for the largest violent encounter
ever. The first jihad, against the Crusades 1095-1291 lasted 196 years; the Muslims
won. The second, against Israel, is undecided. The third, against communism in
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Afghanistan, ended with Soviet withdrawal and collapse as a factor ending the Cold
War (and no thanks). Muslims are willing to die for their faith.
Therapy
To prevent a slide into a large war with enormous, widespread suffering, the
U.S., indeed everybody, should not rush to action. Dialogue and global education to
understand how others think, and to respect other cultures, not debate to defeat
others with stronger arguments, can lead the way toward healing and closure.
Governments in the West, and also in the South, cannot be relied upon to do
this; they are too tied to the U.S. and also too afraid of incurring U.S. wrath. Only
people can, only the global civil society. What is needed as soon as humanly
possible is a massive peace movement, this time North-South. It worked last time,
East-West. The future of the world is more than ever in the hands of the only
source of legitimacy: people everywhere.
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